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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE : BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
HONRUD, : 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, : 
vs• : Appeals Court 
: No. 920851 
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA : 
KERSEY, : 
Defendants/Appellants, : 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(j) and Rule 3(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Utah Supreme Court, 
acting pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, transferred this appeal to this Court on December 15, 
1992. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are as follows: 
1. Should this Court affirm the District Court's findings 
that BUYERS' evidence in affidavit complies with Rule 803 of Utah 
Rules of Evidence and Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
Standard of Review: No deference is given on appeal to 
the District Court's summary judgment, since such a decision 
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resolves only questions of law. Such a decision can be affirmed 
only if the District Court was correct as a matter of law in 
determining that there was both (1) no genuine issue of material 
fact and (2) that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Rutherford v. AT&T Communications, P.2d , 
201 Ut. Adv. Rep. 21, 24 (Utah, December 9, 1992); Hill v. Seattle 
First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah 1992); Sandy City v. Salt 
Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 217-218 (Utah 1992). 
2. Should this Court affirm the District Court's 
determination that the Earnest Money Agreement, as a matter of law, 
clearly and unambiguously warranted that the furnace would be in 
satisfactory working condition at the time of the closing? 
Standard of Review: A summary judgment is to be reviewed 
for correctness, with no deference to the District Court. Hill, 
827 P.2d at 242. Review of a lower court's contract interpretation 
"begins with a question of law, reviewed for correctness: Is the 
contract unambiguous?" West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 
P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991). The interpretation of a contract 
and its application to the parties, as determined by the words of 
the agreement, is a question of law. 50 West Broadway Associates 
v. The Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 
(Utah 1989) . 
3. Should this Court affirm the District Court's 
determination that pursuant to the Earnest Money Agreement, the 
18342.H0583.1 2 
BUYERS were entitled to recover the costs incurred in replacing the 
defective furnace? 
Standard of Review; This issue requires deference be 
given to the lower court. The fact of damages must be proven with 
reasonable certainty and "if there is competent evidence to support 
the findings upon which the judgment is rendered, the judgment must 
be sustained." Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 
1986) . 
4. Should this Court affirm the District Court's award to 
BUYERS of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred because of 
the SELLERS' breach of CONTRACT? 
Standard of Review: This issue is within the trial 
court's discretion and must be reviewed for a showing of clear 
abuse of discretion by the District Court. Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). 
5. Did the District Court appropriately award sanctions 
against the SELLERS' counsel for unreasonable pursuit of issues 
previously ruled upon? 
Standard of Review; Whether or not SELLERS' conduct 
violated Rule 11 is a matter of law, with no deference to the 
District Court. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P. 2d 163 (Utah Ct. 
App 1989) 
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6. Are the SELLERS, having failed to raise before the 
District Court the issue of insufficient discovery time, precluded 
from raising this issue on appeal? 
Standard of Review: This issue is before the court for 
the first time. 
7. May BUYERS recover their reasonable attorneys• fees and 
costs incurred in responding to SELLERS* appeal? 
Standard of Review; This issue is also before the court 
for the first time and is a matter of law. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Appellees believe that this Court's interpretation of Rule 803 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence and Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure will be dispositive of certain issues in this case. 
Those statutes are included in Addendum A to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Sellers' Statement of Facts 
SELLERS have inaccurately presented facts and lower court 
proceedings on appeal. For instance, SELLERS incorrectly represent 
that the BUYERS filed their Motion for Summary Judgment ten days 
after SELLERS answered the complaint. In fact, BUYERS filed their 
Motion for Summary Judgment more than three months after SELLERS 
answered the complaint. 
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SELLERS also inaccurately represent that BUYERS refused to 
accept a used furnace as replacement. In fact, BUYERS promptly 
submitted the information SELLERS requested to facilitate finding 
a used furnace and only replaced the furnace when left with no 
alternative. [R. 43-59] 
Nature Of The Case, Course Of Proceedings, 
And Disposition In The Court Below 
In 1991, BUYERS entered into a Earnest Money Agreement to 
purchase SELLERS' home. In the Agreement entered into by the 
parties, SELLERS expressly warranted that the heating system in the 
home would be in satisfactory condition at the time of closing. 
After BUYERS took possession of the home and engaged a Mountain 
Fuel representative to attempt to light the furnace for the first 
time, they discovered the furnace to be in a dangerous and 
unsatisfactory condition. 
This action was commenced in the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County on July 29, 1991. [R. 2-5] BUYERS filed a 
complaint alleging breach of express warranty and breach of 
contract against SELLERS to recover damages resulting from SELLERS• 
failure to have the furnace in satisfactory working condition. 
SELLERS filed an answer on August 28, 1991. [R. 10-15] 
BUYERS filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on December 11, 
1991. [R. 21-59] After briefing, the Motion was argued orally to 
the District Court on March 2, 1992. At the end of the hearing, 
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the court ruled from the bench in favor of the BUYERS, and granted 
their Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure* Summary Judgment was signed and entered 
on March 23, 1992. [R. 104-106] 
The District Court also ruled that BUYERS were entitled to 
attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the Earnest Money Agreement 
and requested that BUYERS submit an itemized statement of their 
attorneys' fees and costs to allow the court to determine the 
amount of attorneys' fees and costs to be awarded. 
BUYERS' counsel filed on April 30, 1992, an itemized statement 
of the attorneys' fees and costs incurred. [R. 107-114] SELLERS 
objected to the statement and requested a hearing. [R. 119-121] 
BUYERS responded to SELLERS' Objections and filed a Motion for 
Sanctions against SELLERS' counsel. [R. 126-132] After the 
matters were fully briefed, Judge Stirba denied SELLERS' request 
for a hearing, determined that BUYERS' attorneys' fees and costs, 
as submitted, were reasonable, and awarded sanctions against 
SELLERS' counsel. The Order awarding BUYERS' attorneys' fees, 
costs and sanctions against SELLERS' counsel was signed on 
September 21, 1992 and filed with the court on September 22, 1992. 
[R. 140-142] 
SELLERS filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals on 
October 16, 1992. The case was transferred to the Supreme Court on 
18342.H0583.1 6 
November 10/ 1992 and poured over to the Court of Appeals on 
December 15, 1992. 
There are no prior or related appeals. 
Statement of Facts 
1. On or about February 25, 1991, SELLERS Dale and Barbara 
Kersey ("SELLERS") entered into an Earnest Money Contract 
("CONTRACT"), to sell their home to BUYERS Dave and Stephanie 
Honrud ("BUYERS"). [R. 36-40] The CONTRACT was a standard legal 
form mandated to be used by Utah realtors. It was approved by the 
Utah Real Estate Commission and the office of the Utah Attorney 
General. [R. 39] 
2. The first page of the CONTRACT directed: "This is a 
legally binding contract. Read the entire document carefully before 
signing." Provision 11 of the CONTRACT set out, in bold print, 
"unless otherwise indicated above, the general provision sections 
on the reverse side hereof have been accepted by the Buyer and 
Seller and are incorporated into this agreement by reference." 
[R. 36, 38] 
3. Provision C of the CONTRACT warranted that the "plumbing, 
heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems . . . shall be in 
sound or in satisfactory working condition at the time of closing." 
4. Provision 0 of the CONTRACT provided that "except for the 
express warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery 
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of final closing documents shall abrogate this agreement." 
(emphasis added). Thus, the express warranties survived the 
closing. [R. 39, 36] 
5. SELLERS did not limit the warranties in any way. 
Provision 6 of the CONTRACT required the sellers to manually fill 
in whether or not additional items, beyond those contained in 
Provision C, would be warranted. [R. 38] 
6. Closing of the sale occurred at Valley Bank & Trust 
Company on or about April 15, 1991. At that time, SELLERS executed 
a Warranty Deed to the subject property. Neither the warranty deed 
nor any other documents executed in conjunction with this 
transaction contradicts, disclaims, or limits the express 
warranties in the CONTRACT which are deemed to survive closing. 
[R. 44] 
7. Closing occurred on Monday, April 15, 1991. BUYERS could 
not use or operate the furnace prior to Mountain Fuel's connecting 
service because the gas had been turned off. [R. 44, 185-186] 
8. On the following Saturday, April 20, 1991, a 
representative from Mountain Fuel came to the property to light the 
furnace and to connect the fuel service in the BUYERS' name. 
However, upon physical inspection of the furnace, the 
representative declined to light it and reported the furnace to be 
in an unsafe, dangerous and life-threatening condition. At that 
time, the Mountain Fuel representative issued a Notice to the 
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BUYERS that the gas line could not be connected until the furnace 
problem was corrected• BUYERS were required to sign the Mountain 
Fuel Notice, [R. 44, 54] 
9. Pursuant to Mountain Fuel's inspection, on May 17, 1991, 
BUYERS advised SELLERS of the inoperable condition of the furnace 
and the serious nature of the problem. BUYERS asked the SELLERS to 
move quickly to meet their contractual obligation to provide a 
furnace in satisfactory working condition, [R. 56-57] Throughout 
June and July, 1991, BUYERS made numerous attempts to resolve this 
matter informally with SELLERS but SELLERS refused to accept 
responsibility. [R. 66-79] 
10. On July 29, 1991, BUYERS filed a complaint alleging 
breach of express warranty and breach of contract. SELLERS 
answered the complaint on August 28, 1991. [R. 2-6, 10-15] 
11. On September 12, 1991, a meeting was held at the property 
to physically verify the inoperable condition of the furnace. 
Those in attendance included BUYERS, SELLER Dale Kersey and his 
attorney, an agent from the inspection company, TCI, two agents 
from private furnace companies and a Mountain Fuel representative. 
Each of the above personally witnessed the large, visible split in 
the furnace casing which caused the dangerous and life-threatening 
condition. [R. 46] At this time, the Mountain Fuel representative 
repeated to the BUYERS that the furnace was irreparable. [R. 46-
47] 
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12. At various times, SELLERS suggested that the furnace be 
welded and clamped together or replaced with a used furnace. 
BUYERS refused to agree to have the furnace welded, based upon 
Mountain Fuel's recommendation to them that this was unsafe. As to 
replacing the furnace with a used furnace, BUYERS responded 
promptly to SELLERS' request for information to allow them to 
obtain a used furnace. SELLERS took no action. [R. 46-47] As the 
cold weather season approached, BUYERS reiterated to SELLERS that 
time was of the essence. When BUYERS did not hear back from 
SELLERS on the availability of a used furnace, BUYERS had no 
alternative but to replace the furnace. [R. 46-47] 
13. BUYERS filed a Motion for Summary Judgment approximately 
fourteen (14) weeks after SELLERS answered the Complaint. SELLERS 
responded that BUYERS' affidavit contained inadmissible hearsay. 
SELLERS' counter affidavit contained numerous conclusions of 
law and failed to contradict the unsatisfactory condition of the 
furnace or to raise an objection based upon insufficient time to 
conduct discovery. Furthermore, SELLERS failed to address legal 
arguments set forth in the BUYERS' supporting Memorandum or to 
present a countering legal position. [R. 60-65] 
14. The motion was argued on March 2, 1992. BUYERS asserted 
that their affidavit was admissible under the "business record" and 
"present sense impression" exceptions of Rule 803, Utah Rules of 
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Evidence, and that the evidence established the furnace was 
defective at their first attempt to use it. 
Provision C of the CONTRACT expressly warranted the furnace to 
be in satisfactory working condition. The CONTRACT did not limit 
the warranties in any way and expressly provided that the 
warranties would survive the closing. Thus, the CONTRACT clearly 
and unequivocally warranted the condition of the furnace. [R. 163-
168] 
15. SELLERS admitted during oral argument that there were no 
facts before the court to refute the BUYERS• evidence and asserted 
that they did not need to counter BUYERS' affidavit. [R. 170-171] 
SELLERS also admitted that the Mountain Fuel representative came to 
the property five days after closing to turn on the gas and that 
the BUYERS could not have used the furnace until the gas was turned 
on. [R. 184-186] SELLERS took the position that BUYERS had to 
prove exactly when the crack occurred, i.e. that it occurred prior 
to or on the day of closing. [R. 174-175] SELLERS submitted no 
evidence to dispute the defective condition of the furnace. Nor 
did the SELLERS present a legal basis to absolve SELLERS from 
responsibility. [R. 165-168] 
16. The District Court found that the CONTRACT clearly and 
expressly warranted the condition of the furnace to be in 
satisfactory working order at closing; that BUYERS had submitted 
sufficient evidence to prove the furnace was inoperable on their 
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first attempt to use it which was a more salient date than the day 
of closing; and that BUYERS were entitled to a replacement. 
Furthermore, under the CONTRACT, BUYERS were entitled to recover 
attorneys' fees and costs. [R. 188-192] 
17. In order to determine reasonable attorneys1 fees, the 
Court directed BUYERS to submit an itemized statement of their 
attorneys1 fees and costs. BUYERS submitted an itemized statement 
setting out the time and effort spent by each attorney for the 
different issues, pleadings and proceedings. [R. 107-108] SELLERS 
objected. However, much of SELLERS' objection centered around 
issues previously decided by the court such as the evidence 
presented, contract ambiguity and settlement efforts. SELLERS 
failed to submit countering evidence to prove that the time, 
effort, and fees of the BUYERS' attorney were unreasonable. [R. 
119-121] For these reasons BUYERS submitted a Motion for 
Sanctions. 
18. SELLERS failed to recognize the rationale behind BUYERS' 
Motion for Sanctions and argued for their constitutional right to 
object to the award of attorneys' fees. BUYERS agreed that SELLERS 
were entitled to object to the amount of attorneys' fees but 
asserted that SELLERS' objection should not attempt to re-litigate 
issues previously ruled upon by the Court. [R. 126-134] 
19. The District Court found that the SELLERS' objection to 
attorneys' fees did attempt to re-litigate matters previously 
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decided, that it was without merit and filed in bad faith. 
Furthermore, the Court found BUYERS' attorneys' fees and costs were 
reasonable and necessarily incurred. The District Court awarded 
BUYERS both attorneys' fees and costs of sanctions. [R. 137-142] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The District Court's determination that BUYERS' affidavit was 
admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence is correct as a matter 
of law. BUYERS' affidavit comes within the exceptions of Rule 803 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
BUYERS, based upon personal knowledge, testified that when 
they first attempted to have Mountain Fuel connect their furnace, 
they were refused service because the furnace was found to be in an 
unsafe, inoperable condition. Their affidavit comes within both 
the "business record" and "present sense impression" exceptions of 
Rule 803 and is admissible. 
Point II 
The District Court's determination that the CONTRACT was 
unambiguous and that BUYERS were entitled to recover damages is 
correct as a matter of law. Utah law requires that the terms of an 
unambiguous contract will control. Although SELLERS advocate a 
different interpretation of the CONTRACT, a contract will not be 
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rendered unambiguous merely because the parties urge different 
interpretations or would prefer different results. 
The terms of the CONTRACT expressly warranted that the BUYERS 
would receive a furnace in satisfactory working condition. When 
the BUYERS took possession of the home and first attempted to have 
it hooked up for use, the gas company found it to be unsafe and 
inoperable. Thus, SELLERS had breached an express warranty of the 
CONTRACT. 
Under Utah law, the non-breaching party to a contract is 
entitled to be put in as good a position as he would have been had 
the contract been fully performed. In order to receive the benefit 
of their bargain, BUYERS are entitled to recover the replacement 
cost of the furnace. 
Point III 
The District Courtf s determination that BUYERS were entitled 
to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs was not an 
abuse of discretion. In Utah, attorneys' fees are awarded if 
authorized by contract or statute. Attorneys* fees awarded at 
summary judgment will be upheld if the facts support that the party 
is entitled to an award and the amount awarded is reasonable. 
The District Court properly determined that the BUYERS were 
entitled to recover attorneys• fees under the CONTRACT if incurred 
while enforcing their remedies under the CONTRACT. BUYERS filed a 
detailed breakdown of the time and effort expended by each attorney 
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on the different issues and pleadings for each proceeding. SELLERS 
failed to submit evidence to refute BUYERS' attorneys' fees or to 
prove them unreasonable. Sufficient evidence was before the Court 
to enable it to ascertain a reasonable award. 
BUYERS are also entitled to an award of attorneys * fees on 
appeal because, under Utah law, when a contract provides for the 
payment of attorneys1 fees, it includes attorneys' fees incurred on 
appeal as well. 
Point IV. 
The District Court's determination that sanctions were 
appropriate was not an abuse of discretion. Whether specific 
conduct violates Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is a 
matter of law. If a violation is found, an appropriate sanction is 
mandated and, absent an abuse of discretion, will be upheld on 
appeal. The District Court found counsel•s attempt to re-litigate 
previously-decided issues to be in bad faith and was justified in 
awarding sanctions. 
Point V. 
SELLERS waived any objection they might have had concerning 
inadequate time to conduct discovery by failing to raise the issue 
in the lower court proceedings or to demonstrate how discovery 
would change the clean language of the CONTRACT. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
BUYERS1 AFFIDAVIT WAS ADMISSIBLE 
UNDER THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
A. Statements in the Buyers' Affidavit, Attesting to 
Mountain Fuel's Noticef Fall Within the Business Record Exception 
of the Rules of Evidence and are Admissible. 
SELLERS argue that it was error for the District Court to 
consider BUYERS' affidavit which included the notice from Mountain 
Fuel of the serious condition of the furnace and the BUYERS' 
attitude and response thereto. Of course, it should be emphasized 
that the existence of the hole in the furnace has not been disputed 
because all parties saw it by inspection, [R. 46] The SELLERS, 
rather, object to the affidavit as to its substance and, even then, 
misconstrue the Rules of Evidence. 
For an affidavit to be effective for summary judgment, it must 
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence. Preston 
v. Lamb, 436 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Utah 1968). Utah courts have 
determined that an affidavit is acceptable if it is based on 
personal knowledge of the affiant and shows affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify. Western States Thrift and Loan 
Co. v. Blomquist, 504 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Utah 1972). Affidavits 
containing hearsay must come within the Rules of Evidence. If the 
evidence would not properly be admitted at trial, such evidence is 
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not properly set forth in the affidavit. Walker v. Rocky Mountain 
Recreation, Corp., 508 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1973). 
In this case, the affidavit in question clearly includes 
admissible evidence. Utah's Rule 803, along with the majority of 
the other states, mimics the Federal Rules of Evidence. Thus, 
guidance can be gained both from federal and state case law. Under 
Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, hearsay is admissible if it 
falls within certain exceptions outlined in the rule. One 
exception is commonly referred to as the "business record" 
exception. Business records are admissible if certain factors are 
met to establish the necessary indicia of reliability. 
Utah outlined factors for the "business record" exception in 
State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181, (Utah 1983) [a criminal case 
concerning the admissibility of police records.] The court held 
that a foundation should generally include: 
(1) the record must be made in the regular course of the 
business or entity which keeps the records; (2) the 
record must have been made at the time of, or in close 
proximity to, the occurrence of the act, condition or 
event recorded; (3) the evidence must support a 
conclusion that after recordation the document was kept 
under circumstances that would preserve its integrity; 
and (4) the sources of the information from which the 
entry was made and the circumstances of the preparation 
of the document were such as to indicate its 
trustworthiness. 
Id at 1184. 
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Courts are given discretion to determine when the "business 
record" exception applies. "Business records possessing a 
reasonable degree of necessity and trustworthiness are to be 
received into evidence unless the trial court, after examination, 
doubts their reliability*" Idaho Falls Bonded Produce v. General 
Mills, 665 P.2d 1056 (Idaho, 1983). The rationale behind the 
exception allowing business records to be admissible is that there 
is "[t]he probability of trustworthiness of records because they 
were routine reflections of the day to day operations of a 
business." Lepire v. Motor Vehicles Division, 613 P.2d 1084, 1088 
(Or.App.1980). 
Furthermore, the foundation for the "business record" need not 
be proved by the declarant. In Kirtland V. Tri-State Insurance 
Co.. 556 P.2d 199, 202 (Kan. 1976), the court explained that the 
foundation may be proved by any relevant evidence and the person 
making the entries need not provide authentication if they can be 
identified by someone else who is qualified by knowledge. "The 
policy of this section is to leave it up to the trial court to 
determine whether the sources of information, method and time of 
preparation reflect trustworthiness." Id. See also Schraft v. 
Leis, 686 P.2d 865 (Kan. 1984) [Supreme Court upheld trial court's 
determination that the sources of information and method of time of 
preparation reflected trustworthiness.] 
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This "business record" exception was applied under similar 
circumstances in GM Dev. v. Community American Mortgage, 795 P.2d 
827 (Ariz. App. 1990). The trial court had awarded partial summary 
judgment on a breach of contract claim. SELLERS appealed asserting 
that, inter aliaf the evidence submitted by affidavit was hearsay 
and inadmissible under the business record exception. 
The court set out the same requirements as Utah requires, i.e. 
the affidavit must be based on personal knowledge, set forth facts 
admissible under the Rules of Evidence and establish the affiant's 
competence to testify to those facts. Id. at 834. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision that the company 
president, who testified that he was the president of the company 
and familiar with the records, was competent to testify based upon 
his personal knowledge. 
The District Court's acceptance of the evidence in the 
affidavit was both appropriate and well within that court's 
discretion. The trustworthiness of Mountain Fuel's Notice is 
apparent on its face. "Form 184" gives notice to a customer when 
Mountain Fuel is unable to provide service because of an unsafe 
operating condition. Mountain Fuel required the BUYERS to sign the 
Notice at the time of its inspection. The BUYERS have personal 
knowledge of Mountain Fuel's inspection as evidenced by their act 
of signing the notice. As such, they are qualified and competent 
to testify as to the surrounding circumstances. 
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Moreover, "any incompleteness of the business entries . . . 
goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility." 
Wallace by Wallace v. Target Stores, Inc., 701 P.2d 1272, 1273 
(Colo. App. 1985). Although the Mountain Fuel representative 
had filled in his employee number on the signature line, SELLERS 
take issue because the Notice was not signed by Mountain Fuel. 
This fact is not crucial to determinations of admissibility. 
In the case at bar, BUYERS testify, based upon their personal 
knowledge, that they scheduled Mountain Fuel to connect their gas 
line, that upon inspection Mountain Fuel refused and directly 
issued a Notice which they were required to sign. Thus, the source 
of information, method, and time of preparation establish the 
requisite trustworthiness for the business record exception to 
apply. 
B. Statements in the Buyers' Affidavit, Attesting to Mountain 
Fuel's Notice, Fall Within the "Presence Sense Impression" 
Exception of the Rules of Evidence and are Admissible. 
Rule 803(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence excludes from the 
hearsay rule Ma statement describing or explaining an event or 
condition, made while the declarant was perceiving the event or 
condition or immediately thereafter." 
BUYERS* affidavit, containing statements from a Mountain Fuel 
representative, falls directly within provision (1) of Rule 803. 
The statement was made and recorded while the Mountain Fuel 
representative physically inspected the furnace. The statement was 
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contemporaneous with the observati on o i i. IIM I mint n m 11.-1 L ». nJenet-ij 
the representative's employee identification number and the 
BUYERS did not submit Mountain Fuel 
representative actually observed the furnace crack. Rather, BUYERS 
r,.--;- • prove « condition of the 
furnace di ihc , ...,<- che BUYERS first attempts: 
Rule 803 ( :- derived irom the former Rule of Evidence 
permitted a statement uttered 
spontaneously while perceiving the event or condit.. Silver 
Seal Products Co. v. Owens, 523 P. 2d 109,, L-94 (Ok 1 . 1 \* 4 '. . t .1 ie 
^ statement must 
describe something seen, hearo ,.* «<..,., declarant 111 f "'"."ii t M I 
event or transaction, " Jd. SELLERS rely upon Beck v. Dye, 200 
Wasi 12 =su 
fortn T.ne cest co determine whether UJ in'i 1 ne statement shouiu oe 
admissible as a hearsay exception, 
I'll n i i i l ii 1 ii 1 in I I - n i t ' i n 1 i l l i n d i in l IIM in in mi 1111 I t in I ' O H g e s t a e " 
exception and meets each prong 01 the Beck test, .escribes the 
condition of the furnace, as seen by the Mountain Fuel 
r e p J • I mi 1 1 mi 1 s] K H -1 in mi 1 I 1 111 - I n 11 11 ai • 1 - p r i o r t o c o n n e c t i n g 
service. , lade during the course of tit ie transaction between 
the BUYERS and Mountain Fuel and was a spontaneous reaction evoked 
b 
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II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
CONTRACT WAS UNAMBIGUOUS AND, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, BUYERS WERE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
authorizes summary judgment when there are no genuine issues of 
fact to be resolved. The purpose behind summary judgment is to 
eliminate the time, trouble and expense of trial when it is clear, 
as a matter of law, that the party ruled against is not entitled to 
prevail. Amiacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 P.2d 53 
(Utah 1981) . 
The determination of ambiguity in a contract is a question of 
law. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co, 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 
(Utah App. 1991). In making that determination, it is well-settled 
that the language of the contract, if clear and unambiguous, 
controls. 17A Am. Jur. 2d Section 337 (2nd Ed. 1991). See also, 
Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981). 
The question of ambiguity should be resolved from the document 
itself. "It should be looked at in its entirety . . . and all of 
its parts given effect. Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt 
Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah App. 1987). Utah Valley Bank, 
supra. 
This contract is the form generally mandated for use by real 
estate agents. Hence, the applicability and relationship of the 
provisions are commonly used and well-understood. 
18342.H0583.1 2 2 
The BUYERS do not dispute SELLERS' general dshnj l n i m I I i, ml 
specific provisions in a contract will qualify general provisions 
u'li I i.l led-in portions will take precedence 
over form language when inconsistencies appec" 
case at. bar, --.i- inconsistency ' * language ot the 
CONTRA^ change warranties by handwriting. The 
specific provisions q^u... jeneir 
the filled-in portions - CONTRACT qualify the general 
To t'•::" :ontrar? visions ^f CONTRACT 
uniformly refer to and encompass *.. --r -
provisions which required blanks »•• completed, the very section 
,L.^ vi i,,:;^  ximited the warranties , SELLERS did 
nothing i. expressly * ? m i t- any warranties 
are iv .* rendered ambiguous merely by the fact ; nat the parties urge 
*"
1
 • ' * Jpnefc ;.anklef b n ir.2d 733, 735 (Utah 
1980). 
Section i h. CONTRACT warranted that "the plumbing, 
-a lating systems . , shall bo 
sound satisfactory working Cv_.na. . Liiuu ui 
closing," The language in this provision is clear and unaltered. 
"'Tj.I-W d nil i- mi i ' ,i, ,f the CONTRACT negates the 
warranties founc -^Liv,.. However, the language 
provision l(e* - not negate the warranties. Rather, Provision 
• K 11111, r I \ 11 ' '" i f 11111 I ii i H [>"i r i" i n n, s u b j e c t t o 
18342.H0583.1 23 
Section 1(c) and 6 . . .M and requires a blank to be completed. 
[R. 37] Section 6 outlines the SELLERS' warranties under the 
CONTRACT. It reads, "In addition to the warranties contained in 
Section C, the following items are also warranted ..." The blank 
has been filled in to provide that, in addition to the warranties 
in Section C, no other items will be warranted. [R. 38] The 
effect of this language is to reinforce the furnace warranty. 
Thus, the language of this provision is clear and subject to only 
one interpretation. 
Provision "0" provides that "except for the express warranties 
made in this agreement, execution and delivery of final closing 
documents shall abrogate this Agreement." Section 11 provides 
that, unless otherwise indicated, the general provisions are 
incorporated into the agreement. Again, the language of the 
CONTRACT is clear and nothing has been added to limit or negate the 
warranties. The warranties are clearly and expressly referred to 
and repeated in numerous provisions of the CONTRACT. Regardless of 
the SELLERS* present remorse, looking at the document in its 
entirety leads to only one interpretation: the SELLERS expressly 
warranted the furnace would be in satisfactory working condition. 
Brooks v. Hodgesf 606 P.2d 77 (Colo. App., 1979), proves 
instructive. In Brooks, the parties had entered into a sales 
contract for the purchase of a home. The contract contained an 
express warranty of fitness. The buyers, their brokers and their 
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engineer .aspei -.- ; - H >w< 3"\? e i: after 
closing, when the buyers went to the1 residence, they noticed a 
strong odor emanating from the premises. The lower court held that 
the "warranty was breached uj i i m \\\ ni i m't wtM»n t h*-* 
date of signing the contract and the date of closing" and the Court 
Appeals affirmed. Icl. 78. 
In t h i s capf t - 1 roiii/n ' .hi'l'.jnK-Mil 
should also be affirmed. 
r r T 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED 
BUYERS DAMAGES, ATTORNEYS FEES, 
COSTS AND SANCTIONS. 
Under the Contract, BUYERS are Entitled to Recover the 
Benefit of their Bargain Which the District Court Properly 
Determined to be the Replacement Cost of the Furnace, 
As SELLERS failed • 
issue of damages in the lower court proceedings, they ought not be 
JU L O do so on appeal, BUYERS, however, readily respond 
the issues < : lamages 
consequences raised appeal. 
Genera] J *. breach <M contract entitles the non-breaching party 
to rec " ; \ <i>llj | '. ; J IM ! ; ' '• 
1M would have been had the CONTRACT been fully performed. Keller 
v Deseret Mortuary Company, 455 u ;" } 1969) , 
Alexander v. Brown, i -UUM U ± ^ . o ^ n 
v. United Standard West, 755 P.2d J62, 161 (Utah 1988). The Utah 
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Supreme Court has stated that in determining damages, "the desired 
objective is to evaluate any loss suffered by the most direct, 
practical and accurate method that can be employed. " Even Odds Inc. 
v. Nielson, 448 P2d 709, 711 (Utah 1968). In the case at bar, the 
above-referenced principles of law control. 
SELLERS submit various theories, derived from general 
treatises and federal and state case law, under which they advocate 
a reduction in the damages awarded to BUYERS. SELLERS' authorities 
cited are not controlling or appreciable and, moreover, SELLERS 
fail to meet the burden of proof required. 
SELLERS assert that BUYERS failed to prove damages and that 
the lower court engaged in "speculation and guesswork." However, 
proper evidence was before the court. BUYERS alleged in their 
complaint that the replacement cost of the furnace was $1,100.00. 
BUYERS then testified, by affidavit, that the replacement cost of 
the furnace was at least $1,090.00 and attached as an exhibit a 
copy of an early bid received from United Furnace. In fact, 
because BUYERS had to finance the purchase, they have paid more 
than the amount prayed for and awarded. 
Beyond SELLERS' assertion that BUYERS were not entitled to 
replace the furnace, SELLERS failed to submit any evidence to 
counter the proof of the cost of replacing the furnace or the 
availability of a used furnace. SELLERS also failed to present any 
legal authority that BUYERS were not entitled to the benefit of 
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their bargain : ^  support their argume 
affidavit a not raise a genuine issue or ta; cis to damages. The 
U L Court n o ' before •* adequate evidence t i,. ^J ;amages 
without engaging 
SELLERS assert that the plaintiff ib entitled * profit 
more from the contractual breach than from full performance and 
that by receivi i 1 :j a i 1 = \ \ fi in lac: c= • til i s BU 1 ERS 1 recei v e ::! = L i n i 1 if a ] ] 
Under SELLERS' analysis, BUYERS would be entitled to a used furnace 
or to an award :>f damages commensurate with hp value of a used 
furnace. However I H I L S ! f a i 1 . 
As held in Keller, Alexander and Young, supra, BUYERS are 
( ' H i e d to be >laced in ar a^-od a position as if the CONTRACT was 
lv performer nrt» t I M J H I r ^ic> M i n i I li - - - - ....-* , <> 
A turnace in satisfactory working condition. Regardless ui whether 
ixnace is used or row BUYERS are entitled f'%- : urnace ,n 
satisfactory working cone:.-. *, 
the only other remedy whic* - i place t:! * BUYERS :ne same 
L therr h3r? Nir- *-.•.» performance is to replace the 
inoperable furnace 
SELLERS fai t« prove that ~ "-1 rurnace was - viable 
solution. From the start BUYERS communicated that "time was of the 
e s s e n c e , " W h e n btLLihii^i L o q u e & i ei I i n h n m m inn i m m n«i 11 i 1111 i In i i 
and capacity of the furnace, in order to he 11 * them procure a used 
f i nan-1, BUYERS prompt] y provided the necessary information. 
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BUYERS waited as long as they reasonably could for the SELLERS to 
produce a used furnace. BUYERS were not offered a used furnace or 
even advised that SELLERS were looking for a used furnace. A 
reasonable inference from SELLERS1 silence is that a used furnace 
was not readily obtainable. By replacing the furnace, BUYERS did 
not receive a windfall but only what they are entitled to, the 
benefit of their bargain. 
SELLERS also argue that payment from a collateral source 
should have been credited against the damages. There is, though, 
no admissible evidence before the court that BUYERS received money 
from another source. SELLERS' affidavit, made upon information and 
belief, averred that BUYERS received a refund from the inspection 
company. Utah law does not allow statements made upon information 
and belief, without personal knowledge, to be admissible. 
Treloggan v. Treloqgan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985). 
SELLERS claim that mitigation and the doctrine of avoidable 
consequences require that the damages be reduced. Yet SELLERS have 
failed to meet the burden of proof for a mitigation defense to be 
applicable. 
In John Call, the court explained that mitigation operates "to 
prevent one against whom a wrong has been committed from recovering 
any item which could have been avoided or minimized by reasonable 
means." id. at 680. In order to seek a reduction of damages, 
SELLERS have "the burden of proving that the damages shown could 
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have been m' limizea mn ^ u cinaineerinQ, Inc. » , Manti city 
Corp. . 79 5 F ?d f~*8 (Utah App ~°~ v citina D. Dobbs, Remedies 
Sect Pratt v. Board of Educ., 564 P.2d 
iL.ERS » 
argument that BUYERS failed mitigate the damages. 
BUYERS were reasonable *n their approach to enforcing their 
CONTRAL Tl u • sj j i s idequa 1 .( i: :u : • 1 1 c < ; s SEI .1 ,.ERS I : 
respond before filing suit *>. i thdi dui n« work, they resorted 
tii the m i n t , yi'l , continued to cooperate w r * 1 the SELLERS* They 
respumiea | u i imp I i y • * *• 
to SELLERS' request for furnace information. BUYERS waited ... . ., 
as possible before proceeding w :th replacement to allow SELLERS an 
oppor t"| in i tv t z reol ace 11 le * • : • 
SELLERS contention that BUYERS failed to mitigate those damages. 
a- stated in Even, the desired objective in assessing damages 
II I m i " t h e mini1 ' ! r l i r ' f T l , [ i n n ' l I I ni l d i n f H I I I I I H I M I I I M I I N K ) T ' I I H l l l u s l 
accurate method t determine damages nstance is 
compensate the BUYERS for th^ amt.unt they ha \ *.o expend t.\ replace 
BUYERS, 
having incurred * :» oi $i, H i replace the defective, 
warranted furnace, were entitled __ recover that amount. 
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B. The District Court's Award of Attorneys' Fees was 
Adequately Supported by the Evidence, Reasonable Under the 
Circumstances and Within Its Discretion. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the calculation of 
reasonable attorneys' fees is in the sound discretion of the trial 
court and will not be overturned absent a showing of a clear abuse 
of discretion. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 
(Utah 1988). Thus, the standard of review for this particular 
issue is whether the District Court abused its discretion. 
SELLERS argue that the attorneys• fees, awarded by the 
District Court, were unreasonable and unsupported by admissible 
evidence. To promote their position, SELLERS rely upon Johnson v. 
Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (CA5 1974), a Fifth Circuit 
case from Georgia which interpreted a federal statute allowing for 
attorneys' fees at the court's discretion. Utah decisions on 
point, though, prove more instructive and compelling in this 
instance. 
When attorneys' fees are awarded on summary judgment, Utah 
courts have required the material facts to establish that the party 
is entitled to an award and that the amount awarded is reasonable. 
Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988), a Utah 
Supreme Court case, summarized the general principles to be 
considered in determining a reasonable attorneys' fee award. The 
court explained that attorneys' fees are awarded only if 
18342.H0583.1 3 0 
. . : u t e s a 
reasonable fee . h t necessaiiiy LuiiLL-.ic^ ,>y ^iiY ,.ji formula. 
"What is reasonable depends upon lumber 01 factors which 
mi illI Hi 1 1 ' 1 1 1 ! I in I 
989/ citing with approval, Wallace v. Build, Inc. , Id. IJtd11 .'i,1 4U I
 r 
402 P.2d 699 (1965). 
reaching 
a determination of attorney; •« i 
the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of t .1 :ie 
attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of 
the number of hours spent on the case, the fee 
customarily charged in the locality for similar services, 
the amount involved in the case and the result attainted, 
and the expertise and experience of the attorneys 
involved. 
Ici , vJabreica
 y . ^ ^ L L ^ ^ O . . , ! ) , 
Ii I addition, tiv i,.iv*- stated that: 
[Ajlthough the amount in controversy cai I be a factor i n 
determining a reasonable fee, care should be used in 
putting much reliance on this factor. It is a simple 
fact in a lawyer's life that it takes about the same 
amount r time to collect a note in the amount of 
$1,000 is it takes to collect a note for $100,000. 
Id. 
Such - <> "i^ TtKi «u i\ ,vdv " BUYERS could get 
1:1 le assistance of 
the court evidenced by the record, extensive correspondence 
occurred both prior - the BUYERS filing a complaint and after, 
I . . . i 1 1 I | r | ' . i 1 i . - i 
been V,.I1IIH t admit aily liability under tin CONTRACT. 
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In candor, the required attorneys' fees were magnified by the 
obstinance of SELLERS and fomenting of the case by SELLERS and 
their counsel, as demonstrated by the number and complexity of 
correspondence and pleadings in this case and the requirement to 
re-trace and re-argue every issue. Throughout the course of the 
litigation, SELLERS filed numerous pleadings filled with irrelevant 
information and issues which required response. After judgment, in 
SELLERS' Objection to Attorneys' Fees, they failed to submit any 
countering evidence to refute BUYERS' fees or to prove them to be 
unreasonable. Rather, they continued to argue the merits of the 
case asserting that because the case should not have been decided 
the way it was, SELLERS should not be responsible for the fees 
incurred. SELLERS fail to cite any case law which would support 
this argument. 
BUYERS submitted to the court sufficient evidence to support 
the District Court's decision. A detailed breakdown of the time 
and effort expended on the various issues, pleadings, and 
proceedings was submitted, along with an affidavit from BUYERS' 
attorney attesting that the fees incurred were comparable to others 
providing similar services. The District Court, fully aware of the 
legal actions imposed on BUYERS, and the court also having to visit 
these issues repeatedly, specifically found BUYERS' fees and costs 
reasonable. 
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Dixie direct, 
determining reasonable fees
 4S\ ; i^  not. pia; e undue emphasis on the 
amount in controversy. Although * hp damages in this case were not 
substantial , i > " i »•••< ii I \ I - ; - r ' .1 I 1 -, „„ ( 
they had incurred thousands 0.1 uunat: damages, order tu 
enforce the CONTRACT SELLERS, themselves, have exacerbated the 
attorneys * . - I <' < 1. > « » 1 1 « 1 1 > I 1 « «>in| > 111 11 11 I I 
results of then intransigence. 
The CONTRACT expressly provided that either party would be 
1 1 it H i IUI 'i M 'disi (nab 11 111 1 i rm jy 1 . * ie 
agreement. BUYERS presented adequate evidence to enable the Court 
t : make an i nformed decision attorneys* fees. As such, the 
D 
the record and should be affirmed. 
Lah T.dw Entitles BUYERS to Recover Attorneys1 Fees 
Expended on Appea• 
Utah courts hold " i rule of law that a contract provision 
for payment of attorney c f^ p~ includes attorney's fees incurred on 
appeal . 1 1 - - * 
contract. Rosenlof v. Sullivan, o / r> i , u . j ,
 D -{ Utan 19b 
See also Management Services v. Development Associates 7 P,. a 
' ' ' Alexander u . BIUWH , 1 Ii 1 I 1 1 
1982) . 
18342.H0583,1 33 
Provision N of the CONTRACT between the BUYERS and SELLERS 
expressly provides that "the defaulting party shall pay all costs 
and expenses, including a reasonable attorneys' fee, which may 
arise from enforcing the contract." [R. 39] The District Court 
properly awarded BUYERS reasonable attorneys fees incurred in 
enforcing the CONTRACT. BUYERS have had no choice but to continue 
these efforts on appeal and are entitled to recover attorneys• fees 
on appeal as well. 
D. The District Court•s Sanction Against SELLERS• Counsel 
for Bad Faith Litigation is Proper Under Rule 11 and Entitled to 
Deference on Appeal. 
Utah courts find guidance for the application of sanctions 
under Rule 11 in Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah 
App. 1989) [a case in which the Plaintiff was awarded attorney fees 
as a sanction for violation of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure]. In Taylor, the court explained that whether specific 
conduct violated the Rule is a matter of law. If a violation is 
shown, "an appropriate sanction is mandated and we will affirm the 
particular sanction imposed by the trial court, including the 
reasonableness of any fee award, absent an abuse of discretion." 
Id. at 171. See also Utah Department of Social Services v. Adams, 
806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah App. 1991). 
The court recognized that trial courts have great leeway to 
tailor a sanction to fit a specific case. Jd. at 171. Similar to 
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confining his objection t<* ieyai arguments, rather than challenging 
the fees or their reasonableness. The court reviewed the affidavit 
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discretion. 
SELLERS failed * prove BUYERS' attorneys' fees were 
unreasoi lah J! = Ra 1:1 i LI IERS pe rs. I s I: .ei i I: ] j 1 
arguments completely ignoring the fact that the District Court 
earlier m : in;i; specifically addressed those arguments. 
bad faith and without merit ,.; . L.n*. standard L.* Jaylor, 
i.e. wher ^ iolatic- shown, an appropriate sanction 
Requiring SELLERS counsel <o i,c- responsible ;.. pay the 
sanction was also appropriate. In Porco v. Porco, 752 P. 2d, 365, 
"authorized allocate responsibili. laintil : r>r 
plaintiff's attorney as it deems appropriate. SELLERS" actions, 
y i e b 11nil 11 ,i 1 y 11j n 111 I 11 1111'» i i • 111 «>»»' •«• • ' - ' >«i j 111 < "m 11 I \ nn t ributed to 
and augmented Plaintiff's losses require counsel to share 1n 
the responsibility of payment arising from bad faith litigation is 
lippi u"|,i'i iat e . 
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IV. 
BY FAILING TO RAISE AN OBJECTION REGARDING 
DISCOVERY DURING THE LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS, SELLERS 
HAVE WAIVED THIS ISSUE ON APPEAL • 
It is a well-settled law in Utah that issues not raised at the 
trial court level are waived on appeal. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P. 2d 
938, 944 (Utah 1987), Lane v. Messer. 731 P.2d 488, 491 (Utah 
1986), Villeneuve v. Schamanek, 639 P.2d 214, 215 (Utah 1981). 
Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984). 
In this regard the Court in Bundy stated: 
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the final 
settlement of controversies, requires that a party must 
present his entire case and his theory or theories of 
recovery to the trial court; and having done so, he 
cannot thereafter change to some different theory and 
thus attempt to keep in motion a merry-go-round of 
litigation. 
Id. at 758, quoting Simpson v. General Motors Corp. . 24 Utah 2d 
310, 303, 470 P.2d 399, 401 (1970). Waiver is particularly 
applicable when "the problem could have been resolved below." 
Mascaro at 944. 
BUYERS filed a Motion for Summary Judgment three months after 
SELLERS answered the Complaint. SELLERS did not object to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds of insufficient time to 
conduct discovery. If SELLERS had objected on these grounds, the 
Court could easily have addressed the issue at that time and 
allowed additional time to complete discovery. In fact, even on 
appeal, there is no reasonable showing as to how further discovery 
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to raise this issue a time vmen uic problem could have been 
resolved, SELLERS ought. L~ JJU precluded from asserting this issue 
n z w. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the authorities and arguments set forth herein, 
judgment entered by the District .Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /§^ day of March, 1993. 
Patricia L. LaTulipp^, Esq, 
of NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Patricia L. LaTulippe, hereby certify that on the / day 
of March, 1993, I served upon Defendant/Appellee four (4) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, by causing the 
same to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Franklin R. Brussow 
P.O. Box 21705 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
#
 r ^ (y^^f^£^ 
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ADDENDA 
A. RELEVANT SECTIONS OF UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
AND UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 803 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Com- tutional Implications, 15 J. Contemp. L. 81 
ment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the (1989). 
Courtroom: New Utah Rules and Their Consti-
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant im-
material. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declar-
ant is available as a witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining 
an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event 
or condition or immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or 
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement 
caused by the event or condition. 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A 
statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensa-
tion, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental 
feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory 
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the 
execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. 
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and de-
scribing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, 
or the inception or general character of the cause or external source 
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a 
matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insuffi-
cient recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately, shown to 
have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in 
his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the mem-
orandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be re-
ceived as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, re-
port, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, 
opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information 
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regu-
larly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that 
business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compi-
lation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified 
witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances 
of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as 
used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profes-
sion, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for 
profit. 
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the pro-
visions of Paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the 
memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in 
accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccur-
rence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a 
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memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made 
and preserved, unless the sources of information or other circumstances 
indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data 
compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) 
the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to 
duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, 
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers 
and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceed-
ings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings re-
sulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, 
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any 
form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof 
was made to a public office pursuant to requirements of law. 
(10) Absence of public record or ent ry . To prove the absence of a 
record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoc-
currence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement, 
or data compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a 
public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accor-
dance with Rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose\ 
the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry. jjj 
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, mar | | 
riages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or| 
marriage, or other similar facts of personal or family history, contained irij 
a regularly Jkept record of a religious organization.
 k | l 
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements <M 
fact contained in a certificate that the maker performed a marriage "era 
other ceremony or administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, pufti 
lie official, or other person authorized by the rules or practices of a relnj 
gious organization or by law to perform the act certified, and purporting! 
to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable times 
thereafter. "*^M 
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family! 
history contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings onl 
rings, inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, ojj 
tombstones, or the like. $ 
(14) Records of documents affecting a n interes t in property. ThS 
record of a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in propj| 
erty, as proof of the content of the original recorded document and i\ 
execution and delivery by each person by whom it purports to have beeS | 
executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an applicable 
statute authorizes the recording of documents of that kind in that °ffic|8 
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interes t in P r o P e i ^ : J a 
statement contained in a document purporting to establish or affect aijl 
interest in property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of *J |8 
document, unless dealings with the property since the document w a ^ 
made have been inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the R 
port of the document. 
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(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in 
stence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established. 
CX?17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, 
bulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally 
\ed and relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupa-
(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an 
pert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct 
xamination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or 
amphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, estab-
lished as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness 
o r by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the state-
ments may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits. 
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputa-
tion among members of his family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or 
among his associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, 
adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, 
adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of his personal or 
family history. 
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Repu-
tation in a community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of 
or customs affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events 
of general history important to the community or State or nation in which 
located. 
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character 
among his associates or in the community. 
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, 
entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo 
contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain 
the judgment, but not including, when offered by the prosecution in a 
criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments 
against persons other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may 
be shown but does not affect admissibility. 
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or 
boundaries. Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family or general 
history, or boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same would be 
provable by evidence of reputation. 
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of 
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is 
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative 
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the 
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general 
purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not 
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known 
to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to 
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, 
his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the 
name and address of the declarant. 
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page, each paper must state identifying infor-
mation concerning the attorney representing 
the party filing the paper. Finally, every plead-
ing must state the name and current address of 
the party for whom it is filed; this information 
should appear on the lower left-hand corner of 
the last page. This information need not be set 
forth in papers other than pleadings. 
Paragraph (d) The changes in this para-
graph make it clear that papers filed with the 
court must be "typewritten, printed or photo-
copied in black type." The Advisory Committee 
considered suggestions from different groups 
that so-called "dot matrix" printing be specifi-
cally allowed or specifically prohibited. The 
Advisory Committee, however, settled on the 
requirements that "typing or printing shall be 
clearly legible . . . and shall not be smaller than 
pica size." If typing or printing on papers filed 
with the court complies with these standards, 
the papers should not be deemed to violate the 
rule merely because they were prepared in a 
dot matrix printer. As currently written, this 
paragraph also removes any confusion concern-
ing the top margin and left margin require-
ments (now 2 inches and 1 inch respectively), 
and this paragraph imposes new requirements 
for right and bottom margins (both one-half 
inch). 
Paragraph (e). This paragraph, which is an 
addition to the rule, requires typed signature 
lines and signatures in permanent black or 
blue ink. 
Paragraph (0. The changes in this para-
graph make it clear that the clerk must accept 
all papers for filing, even though they may vio-
late the rule, but the clerk may require counsel 
to substitute conforming for nonconforming pa-
pers The clerk is given discretion to waive re-
quirements of the rule for parties who are not 
represented by counsel; for good cause shown, 
the court may relieve parties of the obligation 
to comply with the rule or any part of it. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment added "and other papers" to the rule 
catchhne and added similar language in two 
places in Subdivision (a); in Subdivision (a), 
added the last phrase in the subdivision head-
ing, added the last two phrases in the first sen-
tence, deleting "and a designation as in Rule 
(7)(a)," added the last two sentences, and made 
stylistic changes; rewrote Subdivision (d); 
added Subdivisions (e) and (0; and redesig-
nated former Subdivision (e) as Subdivision 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 10, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Exhibits. 
—Use as pleadings. 
Cited. 
Exhibits. 
—Use as pleadings. 
While an exhibit may be considered as a part 
of a pleading to clarify or explain the same, an 
exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose 
of supplying necessary material averments nor 
can the content of the exhibit be taken as part 
of the allegations of the pleading itself. Girard 
v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). 
Cited in State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646 
P.2d 727 (Utah 1982). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur . 2d Pleading Propriety and effect of use of fictitious name 
^ 23 to 56, 69, 117. 
C.J.S. — 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 5, 9, 63 to 98, 
371 to 375, 418. 
A.L.R. — Propriety of attaching photo-
graphs to a pleading, 33 A.L.R.3d 322. 
of plaintiff in federal court, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 369. 
Key Numbers . — Pleading «=» 4 ,13 ,15 , 38V2 
to 75, 307 to 312, 340. 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; 
sanctions. 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attor-
ney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name 
who is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's address 
also shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign 
eading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when other-
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wise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or 
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer 
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one 
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature 
of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the 
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, informa-
tion, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not 
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is 
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other 
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or 
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of 
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 11, F.R.C.P. 
ANALYSIS 
Amendment of complaint. 
Nature of duty imposed. 
Reasonable inquiry. 
Violation. 
—Question of law. 
—Sanctions. 
—Standard. 
Cited. 
Amendment of complaint 
Amendment by an attorney of the facts 
stated in a complaint was sufficient to estab-
lish those facts as they would have been by a 
verified complaint before the changes made by 
this rule making verification unnecessary. 
Calder v. Third Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Salt 
Lake County, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 168 
(1954). 
Nature of duty imposed. 
This rule emphasizes an attorney's public 
duty as an officer of the court, as opposed to the 
attorney's private duty to represent a client's 
interest zealously. Clark v. Booth, 168 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 7 (1991). 
Reasonable inquiry. 
Certification by an attorney "that to the best 
of his knowledge, information, and belief 
formed after a reasonable inquiry the com-
plaint is well grounded in fact and is war-
ranted by existing law" does not require him to 
obtain a favorable expert medical opinion be-
fore filing a medical malpractice action. 
Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
Violation. 
—Question of law. 
Whether specific conduct amounts to a viola-
tion of this rule is a question of law. Taylor v. 
Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). 
—Sanctions. 
This rule gives trial courts great leeway to 
tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of 
the particular case. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 
770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Imposition of $5,000 in attorney fees as a 
sanction for violating this rule was not an 
abuse of discretion, where the wrong document 
was attached to the complaint, causing defen-
dants to incur legal expense in researching the 
validity of an irrelevant document and prepar-
ing a motion to dismiss based thereon. Taylor 
v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
—Standard. 
Sanctions were improper against an attor-
ney, where opposing parties conceded that no 
38 
B. PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
Neil R. Sabin (2840) 
Patricia L. LaTulippe (5746) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE ) 
HONRUD, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
) ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
v. ) 
DALE KERSEY AND BARBARA KERSEY, ) Civil No- 910904831CV 
Defendants. ) Judge Anne M. Stirba 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Patricia L. LaTulippe, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
states: 
1. I am an attorney in good standing licensed to practice 
law in the State of Utah, and have acted as counsel for the 
Plaintiffs in the above-entitled matter, 
2. Nielsen & Senior has spent approximately 47.1 hours 
bring this claim to judgment; Neil R. Sabin has billed 1.6 hours 
14888 
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at $130 an hour, I have billed 45-5 hours at $75 an hour, for a 
total of $3,620.50. This includes investigation, extensive 
settlement efforts, and the drafting of various pleadings. The 
time involved, as per agreement with the client, is reasonable 
and comparable with others providing similar services. 
3. The costs incurred for this matter are $135.09. 
DATED this December, 1991. 
PATRICIA L. LAttfl/T^ PE /S 
On the //*^ f day of December, 1991, personally appeared 
before me PATRICIA L. LATULIPPE, the signer of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the 
same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC Q 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS was 
mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the day of December, 
1991, addressed as follows: 
Franklin R. Brussow, Esq* 
P. 0. 21705 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
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C. PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Neil R. Sabin (2840) 
Patricia L. LaTulippe (5746) 
NIE!LSEN & SENIOR 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVE HONRUD a n d STEPHANIE 
HONRUD, 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
v . 
DALE KERSEY AND BARBARA KERSEY, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910904831CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
This Memorandum of Points and Authorities is submitted in 
support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I. 
INTRQPUCTIQN 
In February 1991, Plaintiffs purchased a home from 
Defendants under an Earnest Money Agreement in which Defendants 
expressly warranted that the heating system would be in 
satisfactory working condition. On July 29, 1991, Plaintiffs 
filed this action alleging inter aliaf breach of this warranty. 
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Because there is no issue of fact concerning this breach of 
warranty, Plaintiffs are entitled to Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiffs further seek reasonable attorney's fees as authorized 
by their contract with Defendants. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF THE MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On or about February 25, 1991, Plaintiffs, as Buyers, 
and Defendants, as Sellers, entered into an Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A" and 
incorporated by reference herein. 
2. Paragraph 0 of the Earnest Money Agreement reads, in 
its entirety, as follows: 
"Except for the express warranties made in this 
Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents 
shall abrogate this Agreement." (Emphasis added) 
3. Paragraph C of the Earnest Money Agreement expressly 
warrants that "(c) the plumbing, heatingf air conditioning and 
ventilating systems, electrical systems and appliances shall be 
in sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing." 
(Emphasis added.) 
4. Closing of the sale under the Earnest Money Agreement 
occurred at the offices of Valley Bank & Trust Company on or 
about April 15, 1991. At that time, the Defendants executed a 
Warranty Deed to the subject property, a copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit "B" and incorporated by reference. (Honruds' 
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Affidavit, ! 6.) 
5. Neither the warranty deed nor any other document 
executed in conjunction with this transaction contradicts, 
disclaims or limits the express warranties under Paragraph C of 
the Earnest Money Agreement. As Section 0 of the Earnest Money 
Agreement preserved the express warranties, they remained in 
effect upon delivery of the deed and its acceptance by 
Plaintiffs. (Honruds' Affidavit, 5 4, 5.) 
6. On or about April 20, 1991, a Mountain Fuel service 
representative attempted to connect fuel service under 
Plaintiffs' name. However, upon inspection, he declined to light 
the furnace and reported it to be unsafe. A copy of Mountain 
Fuel's Notice is attached as Exhibit "C" and incorporated by 
reference herein. (Honruds' Affidavit 5 7.) 
7. Plaintiffs did not operate the furnace between the date 
of closing and the Mountain Fuel inspection. 
8. On or about May 17, 1991, Plaintiffs advised Defendants 
by letter of the unsatisfactory condition of the furnace, the 
serious nature of the problem, the need for quick resolution and 
Defendants' contractual obligation to provide a furnace in 
satisfactory working condition. (Honruds' Affidavit f 8, 9, 10.) 
9. Throughout June and July, 1991, the Plaintiffs made 
numerous attempts to resolve this matter. On July 29, 1991, two 
months after Defendants received notice, a complaint was filed. 
(Honruds' Affidavit I 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15.) 
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10. On or about September 12, 1991, the Plaintiffs, the 
Defendants, and their respective attorneys, a Mountain Fuel 
Representative, an agent from TCI (the company who had inspected 
the residence before purchase) and two agents from private 
furnace companies met at the property to inspect the furnace. At 
this inspection, everyone verified that the furnace had a large 
visible split in the casing surrounding it, making the furnace 
unsafe and inoperable, (Honruds' Affidavit H 16.) 
11. The Mountain Fuel representative, present at the above-
referenced meeting, reitereated to Plaintiffs that the furnace 
was not repairable and that Mountain Fuel could not provide 
service until a safe operating furnace was installed. (Honruds' 
Affidavit 5 18.) 
12. Shortly after the inspection meeting, the Defendants 
offered to weld the furnace or in someway clamp it together. 
Plaintiffs rejected this offer because Mountain Fuel advised them 
that such a repair would be unsafe because of the expanding 
nature of the furnace. (Honruds' Affidavit 5 19.) 
13. The Defendants then indicated that they were 
investigating the availability of a used furnace, and requested 
information on the specific size and capacity of the furnace. 
(Honruds' Affidavit 5 20.) 
14. On September 24, 1991, Plaintiffs submitted the 
requested information by letter. (Honruds' Affidavit 5 21.) 
15. Plaintiffs' counsel repeatedly advised Defendants that 
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given the onset of winter, time was of the essence. Defendants, 
however, never contacted Plaintiffs about the used furnace. 
(Honruds' Affidavit 1 21, 23, 24.) 
16. On October 3, 1991, Plaintiffs demanded an immediate 
response from Defendant's attorney. However, Defendants never 
responded. (Honruds' Affidavit f 23, 24.) 
17. On October 11, 1991, Defendants replaced the furnace. 
(Honruds' Affidavit 5 25.) 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendants' Breach of the Express 
Warranties Provided in the Contract 
Entitles Plaintiffs to Recover 
as a Matter of Law 
1. A. As a matter of law, Plaintiffs are entitled under 
Section (C) (Seller Warranties^ of the Earnest money 
Agreement to recover from Defendants for breach of 
those warranties. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes 
summary judgment when there are no geniune issues of fact to be 
resolved. In Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design AssociatesF 635 
P. 2d 53 (Utah 1981) the court explained "the purpose of summary 
judgment is to eliminate time, trouble and expense of trial when 
it is clear as a matter of law that the party ruled against is 
not entitled to prevail." Id. at 54. 
This principle applies to the present case. It is well-
settled that, if the language of the contract contains clear and 
unambiguous provisions, the intention expressed and indicated 
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thereby controls, 17A Am Jur 2d Section 337 (2nd Ed, 1991). 
Furthermore, Utah courts have held that questions should be 
resolved from the document itself. "It should be looked at in 
its entirety . . . and all of its parts should be given effect. 
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 
1359 (Utah App. 1987). In Section (C) of the Earnest Money 
Agreement, the sellers warranted that ''the plumbing, heating, 
air conditioning, and ventilating systems . . . shall be in sound 
or in satisfactory working condition at the time of closing." 
There is nothing ambiguous in this provision. The Defendants 
explicitly promised that the furnace would be functional. 
For example, in Shepard vt Top Hat Land & Cattle COt/ 560 
P.2d 730 (Wyo 1977), the buyers sued to recover for the seller's 
breach of an express warranty. The court explained that "if the 
language of the contract is clear and unequivocal that language 
is controlling and the interpretation of the contractual 
provisions is for the court to make as a matter of law." 
Id. at 732. 
Brooks v. Hodges, 606 P.2d 77 (Colo App. 1979), also 
applies. In Brooks the parties had entered into a sales contract 
which contained an express warranty of fitness. The buyers, 
their brokers, and their engineer inspected the home before 
closing. However, after closing, when the buyers went to the 
residence, they noticed a strong odor emanating from the 
premises. The trial court found that the "express warranty was 
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breached by a change of conditions between the date of signing 
the contract and the date of closing." Xd. at 78. This decision 
was upheld on appeal. Id at 78. 
In the present case, the contract expressly warrants that 
the heating system is to be in satisfactory working condition. 
Plaintiff's did not operate the furnace during the five day 
period between closing and Mountain Fuel's inspection. Thus, 
there can be no intervening cause. Defendants have breached the 
clear and unequivocal warranties of the agreement. 
As in Brooks
 f the parties entered into an agreement 
containing express warranties of fitness and had, with other 
professionals, inspected the home. Also as in Brooks
 r when the 
Plaintiffs took possession, the condition of the property was not 
as they were promised. When Plaintiffs attempted to have the 
furnace connected, they found it to be inoperable. Both 
Plaintiffs and Defendants, Mountain Fuel, a private inspection 
company and two furnace companies verified the inoperable 
condition of the furnace. Since the furnace was inoperable, 
Defendants breached an express warranty under the contract. 
B. Section (0) of the Earnest Money Agreement Explicitly 
Provides that the Express Warranties Would Not Merge 
into the Final Closing Documents. 
Section (0) deliberately preserves the express warranties in 
the sales contract from merging into the documents at closing. 
It provides that "except for express warranties made in this 
agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents 
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shall abrogate this agreement." In the sales contract, the 
sellers expressly warranted that the furnace would be in sound 
condition and satisfactory working order. Such clear and 
unequivocal language allows no other possible interpretation. 
Other courts have interpreted similar provisions accordingly. 
In Brooks, supra, despite the sellers' contention that the 
terms of the express warranty merged into the deed at closing, 
the court held that the express warranty of fitness did not merge 
at closing. Id. at 79. (emphasis added). Similarly, in G.G.A. 
Inc v. Leventis
 f 773 P. 2d 841 (Utah App. 1989) the court 
considered whether collateral rights in the underlying contract 
merged into the deed. The court held that there was "manifest a 
clear intent to preserve the rights set forth . . . " Xd* at 844. 
See also; Skidmore v. First Bank of Minneapolis, 773 P.2d 587, 
589-90 (Colo App 1988) ["Doctrine of merger does not affect 
covenants in an antecedent contract which are not intended to be 
incorporated in the deed. . ."] Thus, both the contract and 
caselaw support the position that the Defendants' express 
warranties did not merge at the time of closing. 
2. Pursuant to Provision (N) of the Earnest Money Agreement, 
Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys fees and costs. 
Attorney's fees are generally recoverable in Utah if 
provided for by statute or contract. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 
764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). The Court of Appeals has also 
cautioned that "[i]f reasonable fees are recoverable by contract 
or statute . . . it is a mistake of law to award less than that 
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amount." G.G. A.,Inc. v. Leventis
 r 773 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1989) 
(citing other authority). 
The contract in the present case provides in Section (N) 
that "should either party default in any of the covenants or 
agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all 
costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee . . ." 
Plaintiffs have tried for months to settle this matter outside 
the court. It is fair and just that Plaintiffs be allowed to 
recover the money they have expended. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs are entitled to 
recover damages resulting from Defendant's breach of contract, 
including reasonable attorney's fees and expenses. 
DATED this //2%~day of December, 1991. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Neil R. Sabin 
Patricia L. LaTulippe 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the / ^ l a y of December, 
1991, addressed as follows: 
Franklin R. Brussow, Esq. 
P. 0. 21705 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
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EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
Legend Yes (X) No (O) 
This Is a legally binding cont rac t Read the entire document carefully before signing. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS L I U 
(Sections) VZSm'ZZZ; 
A. INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property, plumbing, heating, 
air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, win-
dow and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and transmit-
ters), fencing, trees and shrubs. 
B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by reason 
of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income herefrom or as 
to its production. Buyer accepts the property in "as i s " condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer desires any additional inspection, 
said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer. 
C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no daim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not 
or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shall 
be brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances shall be sound or in 
satisfactory working condition at closing. 
D. CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well.serving the property has, to the best of-Seller's knowledge, provided an adquate supply of water and 
continued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right. 
E. CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order and Seller 
has no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards. 
F. ACCELERATION CLAUSE. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, 
deeds of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise 
the interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the event of sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally 
approve the sale, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent prior to closing. In such case, 
all earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It is understood and agreed that if provisions for said "Due on Sale" clause are set forth 
in Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void. 
G. TITLE INSPECTION. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion 
or a preliminary title report on the subject property. Prior to closing, Buyer shall give written notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title. 
Thereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer has objected. If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agree-
ment at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties. 
H. TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected. Seller authorizes the Listing) Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a policy of title insurance to be issuec 
by such title insurance .company as Seller shall designate. Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than those provided for in said standard form, anc 
the encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest mone> 
shall, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay an} 
cancellation charge. 
I. EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five (5) days prior to closinc 
a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property. Unless reasonable written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent prio 
to closing, Buyer shall take title subject to such leases. If the objection(s) is not remedied at or prior to closing, this Agreement shall be null and void. 
J . CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement, Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, nor new leas«: 
entered into, nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer. 
EXHIBIT "A" 
PAGE ONE OF A FOUR PAGE FORM 
^J^^T-WONEYjSALES AGREEMENT 
Legend Yes(X) No<0) feARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
February 19, 1991 
DATE 
The undersigned Buyer D a v i d S S t g g h a n 1 c H o n r U d _ hereby deposrts with Brokerage 
as EARNEST MONEY, the amount of O n e H u n d r e d
 < l n d Q Q / I O Q _ Dollars ($ 1 0 0 , 0 0 
in the form of a r a T h i e r s c h e c k - _ _ _ _ _ — — 
which shall be deposited in accordance with applicable s>iate Law 
S o u t h Am P r o p e r t y Mgmt, SJ-l_-U)tN9840 Received by. 
Brokerage Phone Number 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
1. PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated at £ _ _ J _ 4 — 
K n o l 1 C r e s t in the Oty of M u r r a y County of S a l t L a k e , Utah. 
subject to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulaao** utility oi uther easements or nghts of way, government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in 
accordance with Section G Said property is owned ^ , 1 k , l r fi R a r h ^ T a K e r s e y as sellers and is more particularly described 
a? S a m e , a s - a b a v e — 
CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES 
• UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY • Vacant! Lot t | Vacant Acreage • Other 
B IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY • Cornmfflrcial K| Residential ' • Condo D Other _ 
(a) Included items Unless excluded below trus *ale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property 
The following personal property shall also be oduded in thu,
 fiale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title R e f r i g e r a t o r 
<b) Excluded Items The following items are spherically excluded from this sale NOTlfi 
(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS nqnQr represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price 
03 public sewer 09 connected L_ well Q connected • other B electricity E_ connected 
• septic tank D connected D <rnu«itlon water / secondary system D ingress & egress by private easement 
D other sanitary system . * of «h«res Company D dedicated road D paved 
_§ public water S connected D TV antenna • master antenna D prewired K) curb and gutter 
D private water • connected 09 nahiiai gas £S connected t_ other rights __ — — -
(d) Survey. A certified survey shall be furnwsfuwd at the expense of. 
Seller pnor to closing, D shall not be furnished 
(e) Buyer Inspection Buyer has made a vtsu* .inspection of the property anc| subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts nt in its .present physical 
condition, except a s o u t l i n e d i r p a r ^ r a p h 7 
2 PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING The trail purchase n,|Ce for the property is S J X t y - F O u r T h o u s a n d 
,_ A A nnci no _. rv^rcft 64 T 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) which shall be paid as follows 
$ 1 0 0 . 0 0 which represents the aforeosscrlbed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT 
$ representing the approximate tailance ot CA§H DOWN PAYMENT at closing 
$ representing the approximate b*<*nce of an
 GX|st.ng mortgage, trust deed note./eal estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer, 
which obligation bears tnte-*^r *u % per annunvwrth monthly payments of $ _ — — 
which include D prince* D int«i«8t, • taxes • insurance, D condo fees, • other . 
$ representing the approx.ma* Glance of „ n additional existing mortgage trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be 
assumed by Buyer which conation beau interest at _________ % P^ annum with monthly payments of $ _ _ 
which include • prince* • init*«Qst • taxes] • insurance, • condo fees • other _ 
$ 6 3 . Q 0 0 . 0 0 representing balance if an^ .nniud.ng piVK.eeds from a new Mortgage loan, or seller financing to be paid as follows _ 
a t tir\n o f ^ . o s . i n o 
Other 
$ 64,000.00 TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
If Buyer ,s required to assume an underlying o b l ^ o n (,n which case Section F'shall also apply) and/or obtain outs.de financing, Buyer agrees to use best efforts 
to assume and/or procure same and this offer ,s n_t* mibject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing Buyer agrees 
to make application withm f i v e . days * w Seller s acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying, obligator, and/or obtain the new financing at 
an interest rate not to exceed _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ °* - * «" does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within t h i r c Y - t l V C f r q - after Seller s acceptance 
of this Agreement this Agreement shall be vo.da_- «« the option of the Seller upon written notice Seller agrees to pay up to _ mortgage loan discoun 
points not to exceed S 6 4 0 . 0 ' ) «n « .'««•" selle, agrees to pay $ 6 4 0 . QQ to be used for Buyer s other loan costs ^ - . _ , 
Page two of a four page form Seller s l r , C < , ) F > ) Date> £r2i^ f Buyer's Initials^) ( ^ ) ^e j/tfpU---
3 CONDITION AND CONVEYf £ OF TITLE- Seller represents that Seller & nokis title to the property In fee s imple*^ purchasing the property under a real 
estate contract Transfer of Seller's ownership Interest shall be made as s e t W h In Section S Seller agrees to furnish good afw marketable title to the property, subject 
to encumbrances and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by H a current policy of "title insurance in the amount of purchase price U an abstract of title brought current, 
with an attorney's opinion (See Section H) ^ » 
4 INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance *rfth Section G, Buyer shall have the 
ject to any existing restrictive covenants. Including condominium restrictions (CC &JVL/ , 
5 VESTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer as follows D a v i d ^ S t e p h a n i e 
t opportunity to tneoect the title to the subject propertypnor to closing Buyer snail take ti 
subj t t   i ti  r tri ti  t , i l i  i i  r tri ti  (  .R's) Buyer U has Q has not reviewed any condominium CC & R's pnor to signing this Agreeme 
~ \ ^Stephanie Honxiid- Joint Tenants ^ 
6 SELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted 
None 
Exceptions to the above and Section C shall be Jimited to the following 
None 
7 SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be sa 
pnor to closing (1Q Approval by buyer of condition o± structural, electrical, arid heating systems 
(2) Approval by buyer ton condition 6i swunming^pool. (3) Buyer obtaining adequate financing 
at a rate of 9.5% or better. ^ fcV 
8 CLOSING OF SALE^This Agreement shall be closed on or before A p r i l ^ - . 19 91 . at a reasonable location to be designated by 
Seller, subject to Section Q Upon demand. Buyer shall deposit with the escrow closing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with 
this Agreement Prorations set forth in Section R shall be made as of (±§ date of possession D date of closing D other 
9 POSSESSION Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer +m & t C i . O S l . n g unless extended by written agreement of parties 
10 AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Agreement the listing agent " M c D o U g a l - O l s e n _ r e p r e s e n t s C ) Seller ( ) Buyer, 
and the selling agent S o u t h All! P r o p e r t y M g U l t . represents ( ) Seller ( X ) Buyer Buyer and Seller confirm that pnor to signing this Agreement 
written disclosure of the agency relationships) was provided to him/her (40y54*t5**-) Buyer's initials yLA && Seller's initials 
11 GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE. THE GENERAL PROVISION s i t m O N S ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN 
ACCEPTED BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE 
12 AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions Seller shall 
have until 5 : 0 0 (AMfF^) F e b . 2 6 
MONEY to the Buyer / 
. . 19 9 1 , to accept this offer^Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the EARNEST 
' * (Address) 7J ' ( P h o n e ) (SSN/TAX ID) 
}\fn f-7cxott^ m Aft A %i w* .^ as-sira 
(Buyer's Signature) (Date) < 
{Dale)1 
x( (Address) (Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
CHECK ONE 
• ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above 
Q REJECTION Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer (Seller's initials) 
j ( [ COUNTER OFFER Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and 
presents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance Buyer shall have until (AM/PM) , 19 to accept the terms 
specified below. A . 
-"ci y vy< 1^.« t , i . v rf—>m ' KM' ""• — = j — • ' < ' *-* ' f 1 1 tr t_, * -+ ^ 0 ^ ff fr yrteise J 
- • • (SSN/TAX ID) (Date) (Time) - (Address) 
>W\\ M s PI* ^ Y x ^ ^ v V 
(Phone) 
(Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Address) (Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
CHECK ONE 
• ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTEROFFER 
• REJECTION Buyer hereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER '- (Buyer's Initials) 
. 0 COUNTER OFFER Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum 
II u ~v> >p™ -=7/. a~)pnr\ (Buyer's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Buyer's Signature) (Time) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement beanng all signatures (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed) 
A. D I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement beanng all signatures 
SIGI 
A 
I NATUI 
X T) 
Date ^
 m 
Oate 
SIGNATURE OF BUYER 
Oate 
B D I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on . 
Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the D Seller • Buyer Sent by 
Page three of a four page form 
Oate 
. . 1 9 _ -b> 
K. AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person executing this Agreement on Its behalf warrants 
his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller 
L. COMPLETE AGREEMENT ~ NO ORAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the_entire agreement between* the parties and supersedes and cancels any 
and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties There are no oral agreements which modify or affect this agree-
ment. This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual wntten agreement of the parties 
M. COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in wntifia and, if attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this Agreement 
not expressly modified or excluded therein 
N DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages 
or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller In the event of default by Sellerror if {his sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express condition 
of contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned to 
Buyer. Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue TronTenforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by ap-
plicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the principal broker holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an in 
terpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit refwed to herein, the Buyer and Seller authorize the principal broker to draw from the 
earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the nterpleader action The amount of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall 
be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees incurred by the pnncipal broker in bringing such action 
O ABROGATION Except for express warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate this Agreement 
P RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there is loss or damage to the property between 
the date hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percent 
(10%) of the purchase price of the property, Buyer may at his option either proceed jvith this transactionTf Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace damaged property 
prior to closing or declare this Agreement null and void If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees in writing to repair 
or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed 
• O TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport, strikes, 
fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing 
date shall be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided herein Thereafter, 
time is of the essence This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed and 
delivered by all parties to the transaction 
R CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (Vi) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise required by the lending institution Costs of providing 
title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer, rents, and interest 
on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8 Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assigned to Buyer 
at closing 
S REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shaft be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than those ex-
cepted herein If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract,"Seller may transfer by either (a) special warranty deed, 
containing Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the said existing real 
estate contract therein 
T. NOTICE. Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, any notice expressly required by it must be given no later than two days after the occurrence or non-occurrence 
of the event with respect to which notice is required If any such timely required notice is not given, the contingency with respect to which the notice was to be given 
is automatically terminated and this Agreement is in full force and effect If a person other than the Buyer or the Seller is designated to receive notice on behalf of the' 
Buyer or the Seller, notice to the person so designated shall be considered notice to the party designating that person for receipt of notice 
U BROKERAGE For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "Brokerage' shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office 
V DAYS For the purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays 
PAGE FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM 
THIS FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL — JULY 1, 1987 
ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
This ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes: ( X ) a COUNTER OFFER ( ) an ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the 1 9 day of F g h m f l T y 19 9 1 . between VtoviA ^ 
Stephanie Honrud
 ach, rr(c ) f lndDale fT Ra-rbara Kerrey as seller(s), 
covering real property described as follows: 
5420 South K n o l l c r e s t , Murray, Utah 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT: 
(11 Sales price to be $67f000.00 (2) Approval by buyer on condition of 
structural, electrical, and heating systems, and swimming pool will he 
provided by March 15, 1,991, U3 Buyer obtaining adequate financing nt a 
rate of 9,5?? or better will remain as a contingency. 
All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same. (X ) Seller ( ) Buyer shall have until 5 : QQ (A.lvUP.M 
F e b r u a r y 2 6 19 9,1 , to accept the terms specified above. Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse. 
Date Signature of ( ) Seller (JQ Buyer / 
Time * 3 t 0 0 P f V \ (A.M./P.M.) . ' ^ ^ /'-'• '*•''* ?*&* 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTER OFFER/REJECTtON 
Check One 
{/(& 1 hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above. 
( ) I hereby ACCEPT tbe foregoing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum. 
L \tft >'• >• V M f l - T ^ ^V" / , Signature S*Z*^^ Signature C \ Date Time 
( ) I hereby reject the foregoing (Initials) ^ 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
( ) I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signaUires.^ yS* 
Signature of Buyer(s) Date Signature of Seller(s) f\ " Date 
( ) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on , 
19 , by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer. 
Sent by 
This form has been approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission. 
When Recorded Mail to: 
Valley Bank and Trust COL 
1S25 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
WARRANTY DEED 
AKA DALE B. KERSY 
DALE B. KERSEY/and BARBARA G. KERSEY 
MURRAY grantor(s) of 
hereby CONVEY(S) and WARRANT(S) to 
DAVID G. HONRUD and STEPHANIE M. HONRUD 
husband and wife 
_ County of SALT LAKE, State of UTAH. 
of 
with title as joint tenants, with full rights 
of survivorship, and not as tenants in common, 
5420 SOUTH KNOLLCREST STREET 
MURRAY, UTAH 8410?, County of SALT LAKE 
grantee(s) 
for the sum of TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER VALUABLE CONSIDERATIONS ****** 
tho following described tract(a) of land in SALT LAKE County, State of UTAH, to-wit: 
PART OF LOT 41 A, AMENDED PLAT OF ALPINE GARDENS, ACCORDING TO 
THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF, RECORDED IN BOOK J OF PLATS AT PAGE 
138, RECORDS OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH. 
BEGENNING SOUTH 53 DEGREES EAST 50 FEET FROM THE MOST NORTHERLY 
CORNER OF LOT 41A, ALPINE GARDENS; THENCE SOUTH 53 DEGREES EAST 
37.821 FEET; SOUTH 96.489 FEET TO A POINT ON A CURVE TO THE 
RIGHT RADIUS 30 FEET; THENCE ALONG SAID CURVE TO A DISTANCE OF 
66.497 FEET; THENCE NORTH 53 DEGREES WEST 71.93 FEET; THENCE 
NORTH 37 DEGREES EAST 125.114 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Signed in the presence of 
WITNESS the hand(s) of said grantor(s), this 15th day of ApriL 1991. 
^tliALE B. KERSEY .AKA.rfsLl B. KERSY 
cr BARBARA G. KERSEY 
STATE OF UTAH, } 
} 8$ 
County of SALT LAKE } 
On the 15th of April, 1991> personally appeared before me 
DALE B. KERSEY/and BARBARA G, KERSEY 
AKA DALE B. KERSY, 
the signer(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged 
My commission expires 
at they executed the same. 
EXHIBIT "B" 
Form 184 MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY 
Order No. 
N O T I C E , : 
Name Address / ^ f ^c A,i~t-&£f.<u^iSf rl^ 
Your O C X » ^ t t x r *A-Cis*&« -rs? 7^ 
has been found to be in an unsafe operating condition and was shut off 
at •^ r - '? A.M.,<tfWt because j7^~~~<>> &t 
This discontinuance of service does not indicate or imply that the 
above appliance has been inspected for or is free of any defect other than 
herein noted. It will be necessary for you to have your plumbing or heating 
contractor make proper repairs, corrections and a complete inspection. 
When the necessary repairs and/or corrections have been completed, 
please notify Mt. Fuel Supply Company, phone #^£^-3^S2^ 
Signed £ f r 7 
^ Serviceman 
Customer's yj ' / / , / 
Signature "^ * ' - - ^ " / ^ ' ^ 
EXHIBIT "C" 
D. AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFFS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Neil R. Sabin, (2840) 
Patricia L. LaTulippe, (5746) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
DISTRICT 00UR* 
II 4io?H'91 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVE HONRUD a n d STEPHANIE 
HONRUD 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
v . 
DALE KERSEY AND BARBARA KERSEY 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFFS IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910904831CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
We, David and Stephanie Honrud, first having been duly sworn 
upon oath, depose and state as follows: 
1. We are the plaintiffs in this lawsuit and make this 
affidavit as to facts to which we can testify of our own 
knowledge. 
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2. We reside at 5420 South Knollcrest Drive, Murray, Utah 
84107. 
3. On or about February 25, 1991, we entered into an 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement, as Buyers, in which Dale Kersey 
and Barbara Kersey, the Defendants named above, are the Sellers. 
A true and correct copy of the Earnest Money Agreement bearing 
the signatures of the parties is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
4. Paragraph 0 of the Earnest Money Agreement states that 
the express warranties in the Agreement survive the closing and 
do not merge into the closing documents. 
5. Paragraph C of the Earnest Money Agreement expressly 
warrants that the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and 
ventilating systems, electrical systems and appliances shall be 
in sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing. 
6. Closing of the sale under the Earnest Money Agreement 
occurred in the offices of Valley Bank & Trust on or about April 
15, 1991. 
7. After closing, on or about April 20, 1991, a 
representative of Mountain Fuel Company ("Mountain Fuel") came to 
the property to connect the furnace. Upon inspection, he refused 
to proceed and issued a Notice stating the furnace to be in an 
unsafe operating condition. He explained to us that there was a 
large split in the chamber of the furnace and that the furnace 
would release toxic gas if turned on. A true and correct copy of 
Mountain Fuel's Notice to us is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
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8. On or about April 26, 1991, we contacted United Furnace 
& Air Conditioning ("United") to inspect the furnace. After the 
inspection, a representative of that company told us that the 
furnace was unrepairable. We received a bid from United to 
replace the furnace for a cost of $1,090-00. A true and correct 
copy of the proposed bid is attached hereto as Exhibit "C"• 
9. We then consulted the law firm of Nielsen & Senior 
requesting the law firm to contact the sellers on our behalf to 
resolve this matter. 
10. Patricia L. LaTulippe, an attorney with Nielsen & 
Senior, sent a certified letter with enclosed copies of the 
Mountain Fuel Notice and United Furnace's Proposed Bid to Dale 
and Barbara Kersey on May 17, 1991. She outlined the provisions 
of the Earnest Money Agreement in which the sellers warranted a 
furnace in sound and satisfactory working condition and asked 
that they voluntarily replace the furnace. Kersey's received the 
letter on May 30, 1991. A copy of the letter and evidence of 
delivery is attached hereto as Exhibit "D". 
11. On or about May 31, 1991, we received a written request 
from the Kerseys for additional information as to who inspected 
the furnace. 
12. We contacted Mountain Fuel and were told that Mountain 
Fuel would not release the name of the inspector. We informed 
our attorney, and she sent a letter to the Kerseys suggesting 
that because of the difficulty in obtaining the name of the 
14300.3 - 3 -
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Mountain Fuel inspector, a private inspection would suffice to 
establish the working condition of the furnace. She also 
communicated our willingness to allow an inspection at any time. 
13. On or about July 8, 1991, after numerous letters had 
been exchanged between the parties through their counsel, a 
letter was sent by Patricia LaTulippe advising the Kersey's that 
if an inspection was not arranged within five days, we would file 
a complaint. 
14. On or about July 15, 1991, we received a letter from 
the Kerseys stating that they had contacted TCI, the inspection 
company who had examined the furnace in March, 1991, and that the 
inspector verified that it was in working order when he inspected 
it. The letter did not address any further issues. 
15. We filed our complaint on July 29, 1991. 
16. On or about September 12, 1991, an inspection meeting 
took place at the property. Dale Kersey was present with his 
attorney, Frank Brussow. Also present was a representative from 
Mountain Fuel, an agent from United, an agent from Sorenson 
Furnace, an agent from TCI, and our attorney, Patricia LaTulippe. 
17. Each party in attendance, with the exception of 
Patricia LaTulippe, witnessed that the furnace had approximately 
a five inch split in the casing and was not in satisfactory 
working order. 
18. After the inspection, we spoke with the Mountain Fuel 
representative to verify that the furnace was unrepairable. He 
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stated that the furnace could not be repaired and that used 
furnaces were very unpredictable. He recommended a new furnace. 
19. Subsequent to this meeting, Mr Brussow contacted our 
attorney to suggest that the furnace be welded and in someway 
clamped together. Having been told by Mountain Fuel that this 
was unsafe and that the welding could split at anytime due to the 
expanding nature of the furnace, we rejected this proposal. 
20. Our attorney then contacted us for information 
concerning the specific size and capacity of the furnace, 
explaining that the Defendants were going to check on the 
availability of a used furnace* She indicated that she had 
reiterated to Mr. Brussow that time was of the essence. 
21. On or about September 24, 1991, a letter was sent by 
Ms. LaTulippe to Mr. Brussow with the information he requested. 
22. After the inspection meeting, we contacted United to 
inquire if the May bid was still applicable. An agent with 
United indicated that the earlier bid for $1,090.00 was no longer 
valid and that replacement cost would be approximately $1,200.00 
23. We did not receive an answer as to the availability of 
a used furnace and on or about October 3, 1991 called and asked 
our attorney whether we should move forward with replacing the 
furnace. She asked us to wait over the weekend before 
proceeding, to give her time to contact Mr. Brussow. 
24. On or about October 7th, we called our attorney. She 
said she had not received a response from a message left with Mr. 
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Brussow's office. Because of the cold weather, the hazards of 
trying to use space heaters with a young child, and the other 
related problems of health and safety, it was necessary that we 
immediately replace the furnace. 
23. We had the furnace replaced on October 11, 1991. 
DATED this /^-day of /(s'&t/ , 1991. 
PJo^d' //irrMW' 
DAVID HONRUD 
STEPHANIE HONRl)D~ 
On the /c2- day of /(/&(/< , 19*7/, personally 
appeared before me DAVID HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUD, the signers 
of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that 
they executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
I y<£-Lr?V Notary P\:u"z . 
. /y&^&K RICHARD C. CLS./Z.T3 I 
I lafB^SJfej ^Lak9City,Uteh8C1l7l 
! \&3tiFb*j£J My Commission Expires I 
I V ^ w V ' December 4,1994 I 
XiJS^ StaleofUtah J 
1 4 3 0 0 . 6 
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EARNEST MONEY SA1=ES AGREEMENT 
Legend Yes (X) NO (O) 
This is a legally binding contract. Read ttie entire document carefully before signing. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
(Sections) 
A. INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property, plumbing, heating, 
air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, win-
dow and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and transmit-
ters), fencing, trees and shrubs. 
B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer Is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by reason 
of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income herefrom or as 
to Its production. Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer desires any additional inspection, 
said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer. 
C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not 
or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shall 
be brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances shall be sound or in 
satisfactory working condition at closing. 
D. CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private welt.serving the property has, to thebest of Setter's knowledge, provided an adquate supply of water and 
continued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right. 
E. CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order and Seller 
has no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards. 
F. ACCELERATION CLAUSE. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing. Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, 
deeds of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such instruments) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise 
the interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the event of sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally 
approve the sale, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent prior to closing. In such case, 
all earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It is understood and agreed that if provisions for said "Due on Sale" clause are set forth 
In Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void. 
G. TITLE INSPECTION. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion 
or a preliminary title report on the subject property. Prior to closing. Buyer shall give written notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title. 
Thereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defects) to which Buyer has objected. If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agree-
ment at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties. 
H. TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected, Seller authorizes the Listing) Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a policy of title insurance to be issued 
by such title insurance,company as Seller shall designate. Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than those provided for in said standard form, and 
the encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money 
shall, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any 
cancellation charge. 
I. EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or teases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five (5) days prior to closing 
a copy of all existing teases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property. Unless reasonable written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent prior 
to closing, Buyer shall take title subject to such leases. If the objection(s) is not remedied at or prior to closing, this Agreement shall be null and void. 
J. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement, Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, nor new leases 
entered into, nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer. 
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EXHIBIT "A* 
PAGE ONE OF A FOUR PAGE FORM 
COtMt. ICQM—lC 
e«^r*55»X-MONEYJSALES ^ AGREEMENT 
Legend YesOO No(0) feAWjBf MONEY RECEIPT 
nATP February 19 , 1991 
-n™ ..nn .^nn^ R..yo, David § S t e p h a n U HonrUd . . . . . . .,„ n . 
as EARNEST MONEY. ,he a.oun, of _One_JJundfecT M ^ T Q g / l O O — ^ X Z ^*«*™*° 
in the form of a C f l < ; h i f i r < ; c h e c k 
which shall be deposited in accordance with applicable State Law '—" "~ 
SSStt Am *™Vf>Tty ^ ^ ^ k ^ a p O ' « « - by. 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
1. PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated E R N E S T MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated at 5 4 2 0 S o u t h 
—Knoll c r e s t m the or* of —Murray coUnty of S a l t Lake t Uah 
subject to any restrictive covenants, zoning r e g u l a r utility o, <Mner easemente <* rights of way. government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer m 
accordance with Section G Said property is owned b y - M . I c fi B a r b ^ H T a K e r s e y > * a s sellers, and is more particulariy descnbed 
as Same a <; ahdve _ 
CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES 
D UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY • Vac*n« Lot | |
 V a c a n t ^eaQe Q o ^ 
B IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY D Commercial K | Residential ' D Condo D Other 
(a) Included Items. Unless excluded below, i f « sale shall tndude a f l f i x t u r e s a n d a n y o f ^  rtems s n o w n I n 5 ^ ^ A rf presently attached to the property 
The following personal property shall also be ncJuded in thi*
 fia,Q a n d ^ ^y^ u n d e r separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title R e f r i g e r a t o r 
<b) Excluded items. Jhe following rtems are specifically ex^tded from this sale___NQne_ 
(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. tUviier represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price 
G) public sewer IS connected, D w e l l D connected • other 85 electricity S3 connected 
D septic tank • connected • imuation water / secondary system D ingress & egress by private easement 
Q other sanitary system . # of « h * r e 8 Company_ D dedicated road • paved 
H public water 3 connected D TV antenna D master antenna D prewired El curb and gutter 
D private water • connected QQ nation gas 25 connected • other rights 
(d) Survey. A certified survey shall be furmsfttwd at the ttnpense of S e l l e r pnor to closing, • shall not be furnished 
(e) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a v s u * .inspection of the property ana;' subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 belowraccepts^t m its .present physical 
condition,except as o u t l i n e d i r p a r a g r a p h 7 
2 PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING The tcaU purchase p, (ce for the property is S j x t V - F O U r T h o u s a n d 
Dollars ($ 6 4
 f 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) which shall be paid as follows 
$ 1 0 0 * 0 0 which represents the aforesescrlbed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT 
5 _ __— representing the approximate finance of G A § H DOWN PAYMENT at closing 
$ representing the approximate b*itance of an ex/sting mortgage, trust deed note,zeal estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed bv buyer, 
which obligation bears inte-*sf «t
 % pef annunvwrth monthly payments of $ 
which include • prince* O i n t e n t , • taxes, • insurance, • condo fees, • other 
$ representing the approximate tmlance of * n additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be' 
assumed by Buyer, which d^Wjmtton beam Interest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
which include • prince* D int«iost, • taxes,1 • insurance, • condo fees, • other 
$ 6 5 . 9 0 0 . 0 0 representing balance, if an* mcUuding pun:eeds from a newWrtgage loan, or seller financing, to be paid as follows 
a t tirun of r«.ns.ing_ 
Other . 
64,000.00 TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
If Buyer is required to assume an underlying otil^wtHon (in which case Section Flshall also apply) and/or obtain outside financing, Buyer agrees to use best efforts 
to assume and/or procure same and this offer is rsd« subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing Buyer agrees 
to make application within r i v e days z**? Seller's acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at( 
an interest rate not to exceed - » 5 % » R« »vor does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within thirty- f ive^ after Seller's acceptance 
of this Agreement this Agreement shall be voidat>»- «« the option of the Seller upon written notice Seller agrees to pay up to 1 mortgage loan discount 
points, not to exceed $ HO.on . In eiV«t «cin sellei agrees to pay $ 6 4 0 „ 0 0 to be used for Buyer's other loan costs 
Page two of a four page form Seller's »ne*«». { , ) 
f - ^ ) n,.-> t-U-91 Buyer's m.t.alsJ^X^) P a t e ^ ^ f / 
yt*&- a 
3. CONDITION AND CONVT^ NCE OF TITLE. Seller represents taatjSeller&Jiolds title to the property In fee s i m | | l is purchasing the property under a real 
estate contract Transfer of Selle. _ ownership interest shall be made as set forth Iri Section S. Seller aarees to furnish good and marketable title to the property, subject 
to encumbrances and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by B a current policy of title insurance In the amount of purchase price u an abstract of title brought current, 
with an attorney's opinion (See Section H). 1 ' / j 
- 4. INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance-with Section G. Buyer shall have "the opportunity-to Inspect the title to the subject propertyprior to closing. Buyer shall take title' 
subject to any existing restrictive covenants, including condominium restrictions (CC &.R'*). Buyer U has ES has not reviewed any condominium CC & R's prior to signing this Agreement 
6. VESTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer nMfamr.' DavidXStephanie Hortrud - Jo in t Tenants 
6. SELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted: 
None 
Exceptions to the above and Section C shall be limited to the following: 
None 
7. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer is triade subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied 
prior to ^ino: (10 Approval by buyer of condition.of „structural , e l e c t r i c a l , arid heatling systepis. 
(T) Approval by buyer * on condition of swdjnming^>ool. (3) Buyer obtaining adequate financing 
a t a r a t e of 9.5% or be t t e r . 
JLJCLOSING OF SALE^This Agreement shall be closed on or before A p r i l ^ ,19 91 . at a reasonable location to be designated by 
Seller, subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the escrow dosing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with 
this Agreement. Prorations set forth in Section R shall be made as of 13 date of possession D date of closing • other 
9. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer«ft & t C l O S U l g unless extended by written agreement of parties. 
10. AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Agreement the listing agent " M c D o U g a l - Q l s e n represents C ) Seller ( ) Buyer, 
and the selling agent S o u t h AlU P r o p e r t y M g f f l t . represents ( ) Seller ( X ) Buyer. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Agreement 
written disclosure of the agency relationship^) was provided to him/her. {jf)A^^i Buyer's initials i K w (£dh) Seller's initials. 
11. GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE, THE GENERAL PROVISION SfEtmONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN 
ACCEPTED BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE. 
12. AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller shall 
have until 5 : 0 0 (AMgjj) F e b - 2 6 , 19 9 1 , to accept this offeivUnless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the EARNEST 
MONEY to the Buyer. / j 
AT** /Anditf/s 3,//?/?/ //^ih.z^.ii /fve jfpi/i r*?-aa63 sn-u-
(Buyer's Signature) )ate) ' l - -^ (Address) ^ ' (Phone) (SSN7TAX ID) 
(Address) (Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
CHECK ONE 
• ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
Q REJECTION. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer. (Seller's initials) 
XJ COUNTER OFFER. Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and 
presents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have until J (AM/PM) , 19 to accept the terms 
specified belov^ . 
/m vey Pedes / A 
'/v?//rr ' hy httypr nnJ «// cor, I> 
•}* //* fitfiviAr&- /?n Prmh A hr Dam* //<-. St ufV^ X 
Z--Z^-^/ 6ty£~fi!t/> 5?SJ? //jucccn&A 7/&&V& 
(Date) 
lc 
(Time) (Address) (Phone) (SSWTAX ID) 
(Date) (Time) (Address) (Seller's Signature) 
CHECK ONE-
D ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNtEfr OFFER 
• REJECTION Buyer hereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER. £ (Buyer's Initials) 
(Phone) (SSNHTOC ID) 
0 COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum. 
X cf^C*' 
(Buyer's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Buyer's Signature) iTtma\ • 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement Beanng all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed). 
A. D I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures: 
aGNATUR&OF S E L L E R ^ 
0 
Oate 
Date 
SIGNATURE OF BUYER 
Oate 
B. D I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on_ 
Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the D Seller • Buyer. Sent by 
Page three of a four page form 
Oate 
. , 1 9 . 
-by 
K. AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or oiner entity, the person executing this Agreement on its behalf warrants 
his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller 
L. COMPLETE AGREEMENT - . NO ORAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the^entire agreement between* the parties and supersedes and cancels any 
and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties There are no oral agreements which modify or affect this agree-
ment This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the Arties 
M COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in wntina and, H attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this Agreement 
not expressly modified or excluded therein 
N DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages 
or to institute suit to enforce any nghts of Seller In the event of default by SeHer.nor rf {his sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express condition 
or contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned to 
Buyer. Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants & Agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by ap-
plicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the principal broker holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an in-
terpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit retared to herein, the Buyer and Seller authorize the principal broker to draw from the 
earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bnnging the fct?rpleader action The amount of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall 
be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action 
O ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate this Agreement 
P RISK OF LOSS. All nsk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there is loss or damage to the property between 
the date hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percent 
(10%) of the purchase pnce of the property. Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transactioriTT Seller agrees in wntmg to repair or replace damaged property 
prior to closing or declare this Agreement null and void If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees in writing to repair 
or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed 
Q TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport, stnkes 
fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing 
date shall be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided herein Thereafter, 
time is of the essence This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed and 
delivered by all parties to the transaction 
R CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one half (1/?) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise required by the lending institution Costs of providing 
title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer, rents, and interest 
on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8 Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assigned to Buyer 
at closing 
S REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than those ex-
cepted herein If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract,"Seller may transfer by either (a) special warranty deed, 
containing Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the said existing real 
estate contract therein 
T NOTICE. Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, any notice expressly required by it must be given no later than two days after the occurrence or non-occurrence 
of the event with respect to which notice is required If any such timely required notice is not given, the contingency with respect to which the notice was to be given 
is automatically terminated and this Agreement is in full force and effect If a person other than the Buyer or the Seller is designated to receive notice on behalf of the; 
Buyer or the Seller notice to the person so designated shall be considered notice to the party designating that person for receipt of notice 
U BROKERAGE For purposes of this Agreement any references to the term, "Brokerage* shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office 
V DAYS For the purposes of this Agreement any references to the term "days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays 
PAGE FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM 
THIS FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL — JULY 1, 1987 
ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
This ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes (X) a COUNTER OFFER ( ) an ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated th* 1 Q day of F e b r u a r y 19 91 . between D a v i d f\ 
Stephanie Honnid as buyer(s). and D a l e f? B a r h a T a K e r s e y asseiter(s). 
covering real property described as follows 
5420 South Knoll crest
 r Mrrray, Utah 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT 
(!') Sales price to be $67f000,00 (1) Approval by buyer on condition of 
structural, electrical, and heating systems, and swimming pool \sri11 he 
provided hy March IS, 1991. (5) Buyer obtaining adequate financing at a 
rate of 9.5% or better will remain as a contingency, 
All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same Q() Seller ( ) Buyer shall have until 5 : 0 0 (A M (P M 
FebTU3TV 26 19 9 1 , to accept the terms specified above Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse 
Date Signature of ( ) Seller OK) Buyer 
Time ^3, (30 O fY\ (AM/PM) 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
Check One 
OQ 1 hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above 
( ) I hereby ACCEPT tbe foregoing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum 
Sinnatiire* ( .. f~)atf> Signature y^Z^^ Signature ( » Date Time 
( ) I hereby reject the foregoing (Initials) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
( ) I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures 
Signature of Seller(s) /^ ~DaYe ' Signature of Buyer(s) Date i t r  f ll r( ) /*
( ) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed On . 
19 , by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer 
Sent by 
This form has been approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission 053 
Form 184 MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY 
*« ^ -r- • * r- Order No.. 
N O T I C E 
Name Address tt^c A^^^JSC^u^^
 rl^ 
Your ocX^-'z^a >C
 ( J A M ^ V T / T 
has been found to be in an unsafe operating condition and was shut off 
at ^~:/Y A.M.,<tf*£ because \7^4-~~^s ^ 
This discontinuance of service does not indicate or imply that the 
above appliance has been inspected for or is tree of any defect other than 
herein noted. It will be necessary for you to have your plumbing or heating 
contractor make proper repairs, corrections and a complete inspection. 
When the necessary repairs and/or corrections have been completed, 
please notify Mt. Fuel Supply Company, phone # S^u-^ 5* ^l 
Signed £ f r7 
Serviceman 
s y) . 'A/ , y. 
Signature 
Customer's yj ' / / , / 
yj*^-!L_. y//^-/yf^-^y 
&u/mace 
NAME 
PROPOSAL FOR: , / / DATE 
3767 South 150 East 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84115 
Phone 255-9631 
JOB NAME Jk y * ^ - ^ 
STREET. 
CITY 
STREET OR LOT NO 
CITY 
WE HEREBY SUBMIT SPECIFICATIONS & ESTIMATES FOR 
JL /Q& ro&# ^TZ/ /Y#yf7#/<n>S/^u^/f^c^ 
/6>?Q 0& 
It 
TAX 
TOTAL 
CONDITION OF SALE 
All materials in this proposal are covered by the manufacturer's guarantee and will give satisfactory service for which such materials were 
designed Any alterations or deviations from the above specifications involving extra cost must be borne by purchaser Owner to carry 
necessary insurance covering above equipment Our workers are fully covered by workmen's compensation insurance Ownership of equip-
ment shall remain property of the seller until paid in full Contractor not obligated for delays beyond his control Senior citizens 
discount included This proposal expires 30 days from the above date 
ACCEPTANCE OF PROPOSAL 
The above prices, specifications and conditions are satisfactory and 
are hereby accepted You are authorized to do the work as specified 
Payment will be made as outlined above 
SIGNATURE SIGNATURE 
EXHIBIT "C T f C f - v) O 
Arthur H Nielsen 
Gary A Weston 
Earl Jay Peck 
Neil R Sabm 
Mi l ton J M o r n s * t 
R. Oennis lckes»t 
Mark H Anderson* 
B. Kent Ludlow 
Richard M . Hymas 
John K Mangum 
Richard K. Hincks 
Noel S. Hyde 
Robert P Faust 
lay R. Mohlman 
Manlynn P. Fineshnber 
Larry L. Whyte « 
Steven F. All red© 
Amy A. Jackson 
Patricia L. LaTulippe 
MIE 
<$£ 
LSEN 
ENIOR 
^ ^ y Attorneys & Counselors 
Since 18&2 
Suite 1100. Eagle Gate Piaza & Off ice Tower 
60 East South Temple. Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Post Off ice Box 11808, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 - Telecopier (801) 532-1913 
May 1 7 , 1991 
A Professional Corporat ion 
Edwin W Senior (18o2-1925) 
Clair M Senior (1901-1965) 
Senior Counsel 
Hugh C Garner 
Of Counsel 
Raymond T Senior 
Licensed to Practice in 
© Arizona 
• California 
t Navajo Bar 
t New York 
• Washington, D C. 
Dale and Barbara Kersey 
c/o Curtis McDougal 
McDougal-Olsen Construction 
1588 West 7800 South 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
Re: Sale of home at 5420 S. Knollcrest 
Dear Mr, and Mrs, Kersey: 
We are representing Dave and Stephanie Honrud concerning the 
real estate transaction between you and them. Shortly after 
closing when the Honruds attempted to have Mountain Fuel turn on 
the gas, they discovered the furnace to be in an unfit and 
dangerous condition. At this time, the gas company informed the 
Honrud's that the furnace was releasing toxic gas and had a 
"flame disturbance". Because of this, Mountain Fuel will not 
turn on the gas until the furnace is replaced. We have enclosed 
a copy of Mountain Fuel's Notice of discontinuance of service. 
Under Section C of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, you, 
as the sellers, warranted that the heating system is sound or in 
satisfactory working condition at closing. The contract also 
provides for attorney's fees and costs upon default. We are 
suggesting that you voluntarily agree to replace the furnace and 
pay the costs incurred by the Honrud's thus far to avoid 
additional substantial expense. 
Please find enclosed one estimate of replacement cost from 
the United Furnace and Air Conditioning Company, The Honruds are 
willing either to allow you to arrange for the furnace 
replacement or to make the arrangements themselves. Of course, 
if you choose to make the arrangements yourself, the Honruds will 
need assurances that a reputable company is installing a good 
furnace. 
EXHIBIT 0 
Dale and Barbara Kersey 
May 17, 1991 
Page 2 
Due to the serious nature of this problem, we expect an 
immediate reply within seven (7) days. Please feel free to 
contact us with any questions or concerns. 
Sincerely, 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
cia L. LaTulippe 
PLH/ts 
encl. 
12825.NI211.PLH 
D Show vu , . . . -
{txjru i.~..0-, 
3. Article Addressed to: T T ~ ^ « - . ~ X T 
)ale ana Barbara Kersey 
z/o Curtis McDougal 
WcDougal-Olsen Construction 
11588 West 7800 South 
tfest Jordan UT 84088 
Signature — Addressee 
V 
3. Signature — Agent -
-f^T%9jn^ 
n ^ e ~ o T S e 7 ^ 
1 • Registered 
3 Certified 
Q Express Mail 
Q Insured 
PI COO 
r=i Return Receipt 
^
a v s o b r o S S ^ i ^ ^ 
P flS3 7 ^ 713 
RECEIPT F O R C E R T I F I E D M A I L 
NO INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVIDED 
NOT FOR INTERNATIONAL MAIL 
(See Reverse) 
^ f - o S e ^ f S e U v e r Y ^ 
PS Form ^ O * ' ' v 
•^S^ 9 8 * - 2 3 8 - 8 1 5 
• W i S ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Form 184 MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY 
Order No. 
N O T I C E , ; 
Name Address .•^"f-Jc £J*~-*~££r. ix^sr rt, 
Your ocjLfr^-t^y .6-cjsfvts-r/: if" 
has been found to be in an unsafe operating condition and was shut off 
at f^:/f A.M.,<f*^t. because y / C ^ ^ ^ 
This discontinuance of service does not indicate or imply that the 
above appliance has been inspected for or is free of any defect other than 
herein noted. It will be necessary for you to have your plumbing or heating 
contractor make proper repairs, corrections and a complete inspection. 
When the necessary repairs and/or corrections have been completed, 
please notify Mt. Fuel Supply Company, phone ff/sTV^ *?%**& 
Signed __ 
Serviceman 
s y; . A/ . y. 
Signature 
Customer's y,- ; / . / 
6Z. &*u/mace 
PROPOSAL FOR. , / / 
S$ <Jm/i w<mdi(4Mfyi4ia 
3767 South 150 East 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84115 
Phone 255-9631 
4--U - ?/ OATE 
NAME 
STREET 
CITY _ 
JOB NAME J± 
WE HEREBY SUBMIT SPECIFICATIONS & ESTIMATES FOR 
STREET OR LOT NO 
CITY 
/O&.000 ^ / Z / //d>y/7a^^//^uz-Sfpt / ^ G& /Q?o 
/sis ihu//^ C0**J6/£ ZL 
TAX 
TOTAL 
CONOITION OF SALE 
All materials in this proposal are covered by the manufacturer s guarantee and will give satisfactory service for which such materials were 
designed Any alterations or deviations from the above specifications involving extra cost must be borne by purchaser Owner to carry 
necessary insurance covering above equipment Our workers are fully covered by workmen's compensation insurance Ownership of equip-
ment shall remain property of the seller until paid in full Contractor not obligated for delays beyond his control Senior citizens 
discount included This proposal expires 30 days from the above date 
ACCEPTANCE OF PROPOSAL 
The above prices specifications and conditions are satisfactory and 
are hereby accepted You are authorized to do the work as specified 
Payment will be made as outlined above 
SIGNATURE SIGNATURE __ 
C^sr\ 
E. AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT 
STATE OF UTAH 
THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT FOR THE COUNTY- OF SALT .LAKE 
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUDf 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT 
Plaintiffs, 
v 
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY, Case No. C 91 - 4831 
Defendants. JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA 
AFFIANT SAYS: 
1. I am a Defendant and the Seller of my home in 5420 South 
Knollcrest, Salt Lake City to Plaintiffs above. 
2. At no time did I offer to warrant a furnace at that 
residence, nor did I so warrant. In the adhesion Offer to Purchase, 
Contingency 1(e) drafted by the Plaintiffs/Purchasers, Plaintiffs 
expressly accepted the property which is the subject of the sale 
according to paragraph 7. 
3. It was my understanding that paragraph 7 was expressly 
drafted and included to clearly supersede the general boilplate 
language and adhesive provisions of Plaintiffs' form contract. 
4. This contract should be construed against Plaintiffs, because 
of the inherent confusion caused by the contradictions of Contingency 
1(e) negating warranties, written counter-offer of 20 February 1991 
under paragraph 12 of the agreement, "as is" paragraph B of the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement and Plaintiffs' mainfest acceptance of 
that inspection contingency in lieu of warranties by hiring an expert 
inspector before closing contrasted with paragraph C of the Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement and the circuituous contradiction of paragraph 
6. 
5. Paragraph 7 abrogated any warranty and provided Plaintiffs 
the right to have the property inspected by an expert to assure the 
fitness of the premises and Plaintiff's availed themselves of this 
right shortly before the closing, finding the property fit as it was. 
6. The handwritten counter-offer under paragragh 12 also negated 
the provision of any warranty and that Plaintiffs were bound to take 
the subject propery subject to their own inspection and ALL 
contingencies were expressly removed before closing so that sale would 
be a clean deal and I would have no subsequent contingencies 
associated with the sale to linger into the future. 
7. That paragragh 6 says "None" and "None" was a further 
assurance in my mind that there were no warranties that would be a 
subsequent contingency to drag me back into a closed deal. 
8. I expressed to the realtor that the sale was to be "as is" so 
the matter would be ended with the sale and further lowered the price 
to the point where I made no profit to close the matter with no loose 
ends like the subsequent operation of contingencies like a lingering 
warranty. 
9. On knowledge and belief, Plaintiff's were assured by their 
expert that the home and the furnace were in proper working order by 
their expert, relied on same, and later forced the expert/inspector to 
return the fee paid the inspector through Plaintiffs1 attorney. 
10. The furnace was in satisfactory working condition when the 
gas to the premises was turned off on the day set for the closing. 
11. The furnace was clean and serviced in November of 1990 by Mr. 
Sorenson a reputable furnace service person who found the furnace to 
be in proper working condition and I lived on the premises safely with 
my wife and our newly adopted child. 
12. I netted no profit from the sale of this premises which I 
bought in 1983 and only sold the home when it became too small upon 
our adoption of a Korean child. 
13. After the sale I responded immediately to Plaintiffs 
complaint about the refrigerator and reminded Plaintiffs that stocking 
a refrigerator with warm food from the store requires a reasonable 
period of time for the refrigerator to overcome the warmth and 
maintain the cold. 
14. After the closing I agreed to come to the premises to show 
the Plaintiff's how the sprinkler system, swimming pool system and 
digital thermostat worked. 
15. In spite of my efforts to assist the Plaintiffs, they waited 
more than thirty days after purportedly discovering the alleged defect 
in the furnace and never contacted me to negotiate a reasonable 
resolution to the purported problem. Instead Plaintiffs hired an 
attorney who demanded a brand new furnace, threatened to sue me, and 
indicated I would have to pay for her fees. This letter was sent to 
the realtor not directly to me. 
16. Upon being dunned like this I became suspicious, and the 
attorneys lack of candor in the responses to my correspondence only 
made me more skeptical. Exhibit A contains the reasonable efforts I 
made to resolve this matter short of litigation. 
17. After mailed correspondence dated 15 July 1991, EXHIBIT A, to 
Plaintiffs' counsel indicating that Plaintiffs' own inspector had 
found no defect and waited for a response. I heard nothing. 
0R4 
18. On or about 13 August 1991 Plaintiffs* counsel sued me, and I 
was forced to hire an attorney to defend me on a matter which could 
have been negoitated between the parties. 
19. My attorney made reasonable efforts to negotiate this matter 
to an economical conclusion, EXHIBIT B, however Plaintiffs' demanded 
of me more and more money for Defendants* attorneys putting a 
settlement out of reach. 
20. Offers of Judgment were served on Plaintiffs to no avail, 
which included up to half the price of a brand new furnace for this 
thirty-three year old, or so, home. 
21. After the sale was concluded and Plaintiff's bought the house 
which was originally listed at $71,900.00 for $67,000.00, Plaintiffs 
wish to chisel out a better deal, when a complaint about the purported 
condition of the furnace can no longer be negotiated in consideration 
of the sale price of the premises and Plaintiffs unfairly continue to 
demand a brand new furnace and exorbitant attorney fees. 
22. Plaintiffs' counsel assessed her attorneys fees at $1,400.00 
before she filed Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, EXHIBIT B, 
but now states her fees have swollen to $3,620.50. At $75.00 per hour 
that would be about 29.5 to submit a simple motion for summary 
judgment. 
23. Plaintiffs' counsel's affidavit no where indicates on what 
date, what service was purportedly performed and how much time each 
service purportedly consumed, nor if counsel, a law clerk or paralegal 
performed such services. 
STATE OF UTAH 
I ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
DALE B. KERSEY, being duly sworn, deposes and says that I have 
read the paragraghs above, and if called as a witness have personal 
knowledge of those facts contained therein and can testify they are 
true, except as to those stated to be upon knowledge and belief, and 
as to those facts I believe them to be true. 
^
c
--, 
*^ Commission O 
Expiree July 2,1992 
JANYCEA.3YNDERGAARD 
P*(LE B . 
Subscribed and sworn to 
before me, a Notary Public, 
on 23 December 1991 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
My Commission Expires: 
Public 
F. REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS* 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Neil R. Sabin, USB No. 2840 
Patricia L. LaTulippe, USB No. 5746 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE 
HONRUD ] 
Plaintiffs, ; 
v. ; 
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY ] 
Defendants. ] 
) REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE 
> TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. 910904831CV 
i Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Plaintiffs briefly respond to Defendants' Response to Motion 
for Summary Judgment as follows: 
1. Concurrently with this Reply, Plaintiffs have filed an 
Objection to Defendant's Affidavit to eliminate both conclusions 
of law inappropriately made by Defendant and irrelevant evidence 
which serves only to confuse and obfuscate the issues presently 
before the Court because it is irrelevant and immaterial to the 
issues in this case. 
2. Defendant's affidavit does not contradict the 
unsatisfactory condition of the furnace as attested to in 
Plaintiffs* Affidavit which is the primary issue before this 
court. Despite Defendants' general references to genuine issues 
of material fact at issue, they fail to identify what these 
genuine material facts are. Whether the Defendant expressly 
warranted the working condition of the heating system in the 
Earnest Money contract and whether the furnace was faulty, are 
matters of law properly before the Court in a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
3. The out-of-court statements in Plaintiffs' affidavit 
fall directly within an exception to the hearsay rule and are 
admissible under Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The 
statements made in Paragraphs 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 19, 24 
were "present sense impressions" made while the declarant was 
perceiving the condition or shortly thereafter, and the 
availability of the declarant is immaterial. 
4. Plaintiffs' Affidavit, made in good faith and based on 
personal knowledge and a contractual agreement with the 
Defendants, attests to the sequence of events that have 
transpired in the present case. The statements are admissible 
into evidence and show affirmatively that the affiants are 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Defendants' 
request for reasonable expenses under Rule 56(g) is unsupported. 
5. Defendants fail to address legal arguments set forth in 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment or to 
present a countering legal position. Hence, there is no 
-2-
competent pleading before this Court which would limit 
Plaintiff's entitlement to entry of Summary Judgment, 
6. Defendants complain as to the increasing amount of 
attorney's fees. In fact, though, Plaintiffs' attorneys fees 
have increased and continue to increase due to the Defendants' 
own continuing legal efforts, the Defendants obfuscation of 
issues, and refusal to resolve this matter as provided in the 
Earnest Money Agreement. Plaintiffs' affidavit attests to the 
numerous attempts Plaintiffs made to work with Defendants and to 
settle this matter short of litigation and the documents filed by 
Defendants themselves are clear indication of the reasons for 
Plaintiffs' continuing frustration and resulting legitimate 
accrual of fees. Plaintiffs' fees are subject to the approval of 
the Court, and Plaintiff's counsel will readily submit any 
further documentation the Court determines necessary. 
DATED this j^^Tay of December, 1991. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Neil R. Sabin ^ / / 
Patricia L. LaTulippe 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
-3-
G. OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT 
Neil R. Sabin, USB No. 2840 
Patricia L. LaTulippe, USB No. 5746 
NIELSEN & SENIOR# P.C. 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVE HONRUD 
HONRUD 
V • 
DALE KERSEY 
and STEPHANIE ; 
Plaintiffs, ; 
and BARBARA KERSEY ] 
Defendants. 
) OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 
) AFFIDAVIT 
i Civil No. 910904831CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel, do hereby object 
to the Affidavit of Defendant filed concurrently with Defendant's 
Response to Motion for Summary Judgment for the following 
reasons: 
1. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 21 contain conclusions of law 
rather than testimony as to facts within Defendant's personal 
knowledge and as such are inadmissible under Rule 56(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Paragraphs 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21 are 
irrelevant and under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are inadmissible. 
0 0 j 
3. In Paragraph 9, Defendant testifies to circumstances of 
which he has no personal knowledge, which is excluded under Rule 
56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this ^ ^ ^ - day of December, 1991. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
NeilR. Sabiif ^ -yyz^^^ 
Pat r ic ia L. LaTulippe 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT was served by first 
class mail, postage prepaid, on the ^/Qr day of December, 1991, 
addressed as follows: 
Franklin R. Brussow, Esq. 
P.O. Box 21705 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
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H. PLAINTIFFS' AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 
Neil R. Sabin (2840) 
Patricia L. LaTulippe (5746) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE 
HONRUD, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DALE KERSEY AND BARBARA KERSEY, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR AN 
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' 
FEES AND COSTS 
Civil No. 910904831CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Patricia L. LaTulippe, being first duly sworn upon her oath, 
states as follows: 
1. I am an attorney in good standing, licensed to practice 
law in the State of Utah, and have acted as counsel for the 
Plaintiffs in the above-entitled matter. 
2. Pursuant to Court Order, the law firm of Nielsen & 
Senior filed a Statement of Attorneys' Fees and Costs with the 
16221 
Court. The Statement is an accurate reflection of the time and 
effort spent on the above-entitled case. The time involved is 
reasonable and comparable with other providing similar services. 
DATED this day of April, 1992. 
^ ^ ^ f e ^ ^ ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Patricia L'T'LaTulippe 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on the ZC>^*i day of April, 
1992. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
'y^duA \S&^U6*> 
CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on 
the day of April, 1992, addressed as follows: 
Franklin R. Brussow, Esq. 
P. 0. 21705 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
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I. PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO MOTION 
OBJECTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
Neil R. Sabin (2840) 
Patricia L. LaTulippe (5746) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVE HONRUD 
HONRUD, 
v. 
DALE KERSEY 
and STEPHANIE ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
AND BARBARA KERSEY, ) 
Defendants. 
| MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND | AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF | REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE | TO MOTION OBJECTION AND 
| MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
i Civil No. 910904831CV 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
This Memorandum of Points and Authorities is submitted in 
support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On July 29, 1991, Plaintiffs brought legal action 
against the Defendants for breach of warranty under an Earnest 
Money Contract. 
2. On August 28, 1991, Defendants filed an answer. 
3. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment upon 
which oral argument was heard on March 2, 1992. 
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4. Judge Stirba ruled from the bench that the Plaintiffs' 
Affidavit came clearly within the rules of evidence and that 
Defendants' objections to the Plaintiffs' Affidavit were denied. 
Furthermore, the Court held that the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement was clear and unambiguous, that the contract included 
an express warranty from the Defendants to the Plaintiffs, that 
the Defendants had submitted no evidence contradicting or 
countering the Plaintiffs' Affidavit, and that the Plaintiffs 
were entitled to damages for the costs of the furnace, and also 
for reasonable attorneys fees and costs. 
5. Plaintiffs' counsel was ordered to submit to the Court 
an accounting statement of fees and costs, upon which the 
Defendants were instructed to make objections in accord with the 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
6. Plaintiffs submitted a Statement of Attorneys Fees and 
Costs with the Court. 
7. Defendant did not file objections within ten days from 
the date the Statement was filed. 
8. On April 28, 1992, more then ten days after the 
Statement of Attorneys Fees and Costs had been submitted to the 
Court, Defendants' counsel sent a letter to the Judge asking that 
the Court inform counsel of a date for hearing or how the Court 
wished to proceed. 
9. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for an Award of Attorneys 
Fees and Costs on April 30, 1992, with a supporting affidavit. 
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10. Defendants filed a Response to Motion Objection on 
May 8, 1992. 
11. In their Response, Defendants raise numerous arguments, 
many of which have already been litigated and decided by this 
Court. For example, Defendants again raise the same issues of 
warranty, contract, and the admissibility of Plaintiffs' 
Affidavit. 
12. Even though the Court specifically found that the 
summary judgment hearing was equivalent to their day in court, 
Defendants again demand a hearing based on having previously 
asserted the due process right to trial by jury. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs are entitled to sanctions against 
the Defendants for harassment# unnecessary 
delay, and needlessly increasing the cost of 
litigation. 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
the signature of an attorney 
"constitutes a certification by him that he has 
read the pleading, motion, or other paper, and 
that to the best of his knowledge, information and 
belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well 
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law 
for a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, and 
that it is not interposed for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation." 
Additionally, § 78-27-56 of the Utah Code Annotated, provides 
that in civil actions the court shall award reasonable attorneys 
fees to the prevailing party "if the court determines that the 
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action or defense to the action was without merit, and not 
brought or asserted in good faith . . . " Jd. at 442. 
Under both provisions, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award 
of attorneys fees and costs. Defendants' objection demonstrates 
why this case has continued in the manner it has, and why the 
attorneys fees and costs are at their current level. 
Disregarding the court's ruling, Defendants raise arguments, 
previously heard and decided by this Court, to again be addressed 
at an evidentiary hearing. Such action is an inappropriate 
attempt on Defendants' part to prolong or delay the final outcome 
of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the integrity of the judicial system, matters ought to 
be handled in accordance with Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rules 
of Evidence. Otherwise, the burden is placed on opposing parties 
to bear costs of frivolous motions, etc. Plaintiffs suggest that 
under the circumstance, this is an instance when sanctions are 
appropriate. 
DATED this day of May, 1992. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO MOTION OBJECTION AND MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the day of 
May, 1992, addressed as follows: 
Franklin R. Brussow, Esq, 
P. O. 21705 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
/OW^^ 
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